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ABSTRACT
Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is envisioned as an integral part of the Intel-
ligent Transportation Systems as it promises various services and benefits such as road
safety, traffic efficiency, navigation and infotainment services. However, the security
and privacy risks associated with the wireless communication are often overlooked.
Messages exchanged in VANET wireless communication carry inferable Personally
Identifiable Information(PII). This introduces several privacy threats that could limit
the adoption of VANET. The quantification of these privacy threats is an active
research area in VANET security and privacy domains. The Pseudonymisation tech-
nique is currently the most preferred solution for critical privacy threats in VANET
to provide conditional anonymous authentication. In the existing literature, several
Pseudonym Changing Schemes(PCS) have been proposed as effective de-identification
approaches to prevent the inference of PII. However, for various reasons, none of the
proposed schemes received public acceptance. Moreover, one of the open research
challenges is to compare different PCSs under varying circumstances with a set of
standardized experimenting parameters and consistent metrics. In this research, we
propose a framework to assess the effectiveness of PCSs in VANET with a systematic
approach. This comprehensive equitable framework consists of a variety of building
blocks which are segmented into correlated sub-domains named Mobility Models, Ad-
versary Models, and Privacy Metrics. Our research introduces a standard method-
ology to evaluate and compare VANET PCSs using a generic simulation setup to
obtain optimal, realistic and most importantly, consistent results. This road map for
the simulation setup aims to help the research & development community to develop,
assess and compare the PCS with standard set of parameters for proper analysis and
reporting of new PCSs. The assessment of PCS should not only be equitable but also
realistic and feasible. Therefore, the sub-domains of the framework need coherent
as well as practically applicable characteristics. The Mobility Model is the layout of
the traffic on the road which has varying features such as traffic density and traffic
scenarios based on the geographical maps. A diverse range of Adversary Models are
V
important for pragmatic evaluation of the PCSs which not only considers the pres-
ence of global passive adversary but also observes the effect of intelligent and strategic
’local attacker’ placements. The biggest challenge in the privacy measurement is the
fact that it is a context-based evaluation. In the literature, the PCSs are evaluated
using either user-oriented or adversary-oriented metrics. Under all circumstances, the
PCSs should be assessed from both user and adversary perspectives.
Using this framework, we determined that a local passive adversary can be strong
based on the attacking capabilities. Therefore, we propose two intelligent adversary
placements which help in privacy assessment with realistic adversary modeling. When
the existing PCSs are assessed with our systematic approach, consistent models and
metrics, we identified the privacy vulnerabilities and the limitations of existing PCSs.
There was a need for comprehensive PCS which consider the context of the vehicles
and the changing traffic patterns in the neighbourhood. Consequently, we developed
a Context-Aware & Traffic Based PCS that focuses on increasing the overall rate of
confusion for the adversary and to reduce deterministic information regarding the
pseudonym change. It is achieved by increasing the number of dynamic attributes
in the proposed PCS for inference of the changing pattern of the pseudonyms. The
PCS increases the anonymity of the vehicle by having the synchronized pseudonym
changes. The details given under the sub-domains of the framework solidifies our
findings to strengthen the privacy assessment of our proposed PCS.
VI
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1.1 Vehicular Ad hoc Network
A Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) consists of smart vehicles on the road and
provides communication services among nearby vehicles and with roadside infras-
tructure [4]. The technology is dedicated to increasing the safety and prevention of
traffic congestion due to the growing number of vehicles on the road. Wireless com-
munication will enable the situational awareness of the vehicles. Today, the vehicles
are equipped with Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems (ADAS) [5], which helps the
driver by giving safety alerts and warnings. These electronic systems are equipped
within the vehicle and are limited to the host vehicle for these alerts. As shown in
Fig. 1.1, the drivers will be able to receive the safety alerts from the surroundings by
providing connectivity among all the vehicles.
Figure 1.1: Vehicular Ad-hoc Network [1]
1
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When crossing from an intersection, the nearby vehicles, traffic lights and pedes-
trians send their status messages, which allow the vehicle to make a safety-related
decision based on safety applications. These applications take all received messages
from the surroundings and generate safety-critical warnings and alerts.
This technology will revolutionize the transportation systems and will bring a safer
experience for the drivers on the road. The communication among various entities
in the vehicular network is generally called Vehicle to Everything Communication
(V2X). As shown in Fig. 1.2, the communication can take place from a vehicle
to infrastructure, another vehicle, pedestrian, a mobile device, grid and network.
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [6] is an IEEE 802.11p based wireless
communication technology for Vehicle to Vehicle Communication (V2V) [7] to enable
cooperative awareness. It provides high-speed direct communication for safety among
vehicles and nearby infrastructure. DSRC is non-interoperable with cellular networks.
The communication among the vehicles is carried out on a radio frequency band
of 75 MHz on 5.9 GHz of radio spectrum. It is reserved for the use of Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS).
Figure 1.2: V2X Communication [2]
At the time of writing this dissertation, there is a new technology gaining momen-
tum, known as Cellular-Vehicle to Everything (C-V2X) communication [8]. C-V2X
is a 3GPP standard that is the alternative to IEEE802.11p for V2X communication,
and it has an evolutionary path towards 5G. Many automakers in Japan, Europe and
2
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North America, like Toyota, General Motors and Volkswagen, have started deploy-
ing with IEEE 802.11p based V2X technology in 2019. While automakers like Ford
plan to integrate C-V2X in their new vehicles by 2022 [9]. Currently, the industry is
waiting for the USA Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to make the final
decision on the 5.9GHz band allocation. In this dissertation, our work is focused on
using the DSRC protocol.
Figure 1.3: DSRC based Vehicular Communication
Fig. 1.3 shows various participating entities in the vehicular network and their
communication. The vehicles have On-Board Unit (OBU), which enables DSRC com-
munication with each other and the Road Side Unit (RSU) that constitute the infras-
tructure, including traffic signal controllers, roadside signage systems, cameras, and
parking meters. These RSUs are directly connected to the back-end service providers
such as Certificate Authority, which deals with short-term certificate provisioning,
Location Authority and Law Enforcement Authority.
Fig. 1.4 illustrates the layered model of the Wireless Access for Vehicular Environ-
ment (WAVE) architecture [10] protocol system, which is a new standard for vehicular
communication. IEEE 802.11P WAVE is only a part of a group of standards related
to all layers of protocols for DSRC-based operations. The scope of IEEE 802.11 is
strictly limited to MAC and PHY level standards with a single logical channel. The
challenges and knowledge related to the DSRC channel plan and operational concept
3
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Figure 1.4: WAVE Architecture for VANET [3]
are controlled by upper layer IEEE 1609 standards. Especially, IEEE 1609.4 standard
is right above IEEE 802.11p, which enables the operation of upper layers across mul-
tiple channels without requiring knowledge of PHY layer parameters. IEEE 1609.2
is dedicated to DSRC security, which runs along with IEEE 1609.3 and SAE J2735
and SAE J2945 for V2V communication.
This technology is still in development, and several issues need investigation and
extensive analysis. There is a need for a realistic definition of security and privacy in
the context of V2X communication, as it can have a direct impact on human lives.
The user information is sensitive and prone to new security and privacy attacks in
this evolving cyberspace.
1.2 Privacy in Intelligent Transportation Systems
ITS aims to have efficient traffic management and safer driving experience [11]. ITS
applications rely on the real-time information of the vehicles on the road. Therefore,
a wireless communication network is an essential requirement for data collection. The
information associated with a car can be used to infer the driving behaviour when
the vehicular sensor information is collected over time. It is predicted that future
technologies will equip the vehicles with advanced navigation systems and will gather
4
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sensor data from more than 200 sensors in a vehicle [12]. This information is primarily
intended for communicating road conditions and driving preferences to manage traffic
congestion and prevent collisions. However, the data collected with high precision and
sensitive information such as location, timestamp and a vehicle identifier introduce
a privacy threat. With this set of data, precise movement patterns can be inferred
along with driving behaviour, which can lead to long term driver profiling and vehicle
tracking. Many people are legitimately concerned about their privacy, and automobile
manufacturers need to pay attention to the system design for privacy starting at the
development phase. The easiest way to ensure privacy is not to share any driving
information and operate as an isolated system, which is the case for most vehicles on
the road today. However, this approach will fail to take advantage of the tremendous
benefits that can be achieved in a connected vehicular environment. Therefore, a
balance is required to determine what information can be shared and with whom.
1.2.1 What is Privacy?
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) [13] divide the privacy into five properties.
Anonymity of the driver is the property that the target vehicle is indistinguishable
from all the neighbouring vehicles. Undetectability is the property when the adversary
fails to identify the existence of the target vehicle or a specific message that helps in
recognizing the target vehicle. Unlinkability describes the inability to link temporary
vehicle identifiers of the same vehicle Plausible deniability refers to the subject’s
ability to deny the performed action. Confidentiality describes the inability of the
attacker to access the content of the messages that reveal sensitive information, e.g.
in plain text.
The privacy of an individual is considered a fundamental right in most parts of
the world. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [14] declares that
everyone has a right to privacy at home, with family and in correspondence. The
Global Internet Campaign [15] presented a report which classifies privacy in four
categories: Information privacy, location privacy, the privacy of communication and
territorial privacy. Generally, the privacy of the location information is about control-
5
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ling access to this information. The user must know how much information is being
collected, used and stored by the service providers. With technological advancements
and pervasive computing, people often have to choose between using the services for
convenience or sacrificing personal privacy.
Often, it is a general public consensus that information cannot be of any use for
anyone. However, with the rise of personalized advertisements, a massive amount of
data is already being collected and used for targeted ads. With information asym-
metry [16], it becomes evident that individuals are often unable to see the extent
to which various industries are using their data. Upon examining the profiling in-
formation, a significant amount of private information about an individual can be
revealed, which cannot be otherwise obtained. One of the use cases is to have the
frequently visited location map to know the activities of the person, further using
this information in insurance cases, lawsuits, personal disputes. Vehicle tracking can
be used legitimately for surveillance purposes by authorities. On the other hand, if
an adversary starts vehicle tracking due to malicious intent, then it can escalate the
level of the threat to the safety and security of the person in addition to the privacy.
Dötzer [17] has discussed several examples of the VANET privacy problems related to
the information used by police, private investigator, insurance companies and foreign
secret services. As VANET requires the vehicles to broadcast the location informa-
tion without encryption frequently, adversaries can easily eavesdrop this information
and can track the driver. Therefore, the upcoming technologies must focus on the
privacy aspects of using location information.
1.2.2 Privacy Challenge in Vehicular Networks
In V2V, the most important message is the Basic Safety Message (BSM), which
is defined by SAE J2735 Message Set Dictionary [18] and it conveys vehicle state
information in the range of 300m for safety applications. BSM contains the data
elements, including the vehicle status, position, size and other additional information
as required by the type of safety application. BSMs consists of two parts: Part
I contains critical state information sent to all the nearby vehicles every tenth of
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a second, and Part II contains less important information, which is required less
frequently and not present in every BSM transmission. Fig. 1.5 shows some of the
properties included in each part of the BSM.
Figure 1.5: Basic Safety Message
Vehicles broadcast BSMs unlike any other one to one communication. In a mobile
ad hoc network, the communication channel is secured for one to one wireless com-
munication. Nevertheless, this is a new challenge in VANET, that the transmission of
the safety messages is without encryption. It introduces the threat to the information
associated with the vehicle, which can be collected over time and then aggregated to
get useful knowledge. This knowledge can be of trips taken by a vehicle and would
directly relate to frequently visited places like home, work or hospital. When the
information can be deduced by listening to the safety messages, the vehicle can be
tracked based on location, time, and fixed road network. In the connected vehicle en-
vironment, the vehicle joins the communication network and starts sending BSMs ten
times per second message rate. The messages are not encrypted to increase computa-
tional performance in real-time. The message contains the geographical information
as latitude and longitude, current time with a resolution of 1 millisecond, positional
accuracy, and a temporary identifier to correlate the stream of BSMs from a given
sender. This set of information can reveal Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
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when the adversary collects BSMs over time. Another DSRC equipment can listen
to the continuous broadcasting stream of BSMs and can gather the data based on
location, time and temporary identifier. Over time, the data correlation may infer
sensitive information such as the person’s driving behaviours, driving patterns, fre-
quently visited places. As the collected data has a high precision for position and
time, there are significant chances for complete vehicle tracking and driver profiling.
Figure 1.6: Authorized participation in VANET based on an original Vehicle Identifier
Figure 1.7: Current Location privacy Problem
The network of the connected vehicles is going to be vast, and the safety infor-
mation broadcast among these vehicles will facilitate the location, situational and
context awareness. These messages must be sent from an authorized, active vehicle,
and the information in the message must be authentic. To have the authorization to
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participate in the vehicular network, the vehicle will use an identifier given by the
authorities, and this identification will be of the vehicle such as Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN), as shown in Fig. 1.6. It will send the message using this identification
once the vehicle is authorized and participates in the vehicle to vehicle communica-
tion. The problem of location privacy arises when a vehicle uses the same identifier,
VIN, for all the messages with location and time information. Fig. 1.7, illustrates the
general location privacy problem showing how the use of safety messages can lead to
vehicle tracking when an original and static identifier (e.g. VIN) is always attached
to streaming location information. As WAVE standard [10] has multiple layers, and
each layer has multiple identifiers, there is a requirement that the identifiers on all of
these layers are changed frequently to ultimately achieve the anonymity [19].
1.2.3 Current state of privacy in VANET
The privacy issues can arise as soon as the collected data forms the information trail
with an identifier. To preserve privacy, the first step is to dissociate the identifier
and information trail. Pseudonymization is a widely accepted approach to solve this
problem of location privacy. Pseudonyms are the temporary identifiers that hide the
vehicle’s real ID and can be used to authorize a vehicle to be the part of the vehicular
network. It is essential to change these temporary identifiers from time to time to
disconnect the information stream associated with a specific identifier.
This changing of the pseudonym plays a vital role in preserving privacy, and
the technique to change pseudonym is generally referred to as Pseudonym Changing
Scheme (PCS). Several PCSs have been proposed in the last few years. They use
many different approaches, such as changing pseudonyms based on the number of
neighbouring vehicles, vehicle speed, area or zone, radio silence. The common idea
is to maintain unlinkabiliy and untraceability. Unlinkability refers to the inability
to relate two pseudonyms of a vehicle, and untraceability refers to the inability to
correlate the location information with a set of pseudonyms to infer private informa-
tion of vehicle’s whereabouts. The primary objective of the PCSs is to determine an
effective way to change pseudonyms in such a way as to create the maximum possible
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confusion for the attacker. However, there are additional constraints that must be
considered, e.g. changing pseudonyms at a rapid rate can impede tracking but may
exhaust the given set of pseudonyms. Periodically changing pseudonyms are compu-
tationally simple but allows the adversary to predict and correlate the new and old
pseudonyms. A suitable PCS should provide unlinkability of the pseudonyms with
low communication overhead and without exhausting the available set of pseudonyms.
Figure 1.8: Authorized participation in VANET based on Pseudonym
Figure 1.9: Use of the pseudonym (temporary identifier) is widely accepted approach
to preserve privacy
A Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [20] can be used for managing
all the credentials and identities of the vehicles. As all the vehicles in the network
must be authorized participants, this process of assigning the pseudonyms to the ve-
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hicles is carried out by Certificate Authority (CA). CA ensures that the vehicle has
a legitimate vehicle identifier such as Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) to register
on the communication network. Each vehicle receives a set of pseudonyms, and CA
keeps a record of the association of real ID to these pseudonyms. Fig. 1.8 shows
that the vehicle participates in the vehicular network using a pseudonym instead of
an original identity. Fig. 1.9 demonstrates that the use of pseudonyms as the tempo-
rary identifiers can disrupt the direct inference of the location information associated
with a vehicle. The adoption of a pseudonym for authentication of BSM leads to an
increase in anonymity potentially. Due to the possibility of malicious vehicles in the
network, it is essential to hold the vehicles accountable for their actions by keeping
the record of their identities. This prevents the implementation of perfect privacy in
vehicular communication as the authorities have private information. This kind of
privacy is known as conditional privacy, which means that the real identification and
the associated temporary identifiers of the vehicle are not revealed to any other par-
ticipant of the communication network unless the vehicle has performed a malicious
activity.
1.2.4 Open Challenges
The existing work on VANET privacy addresses some of the important challenges for
pseudonym changing schemes. However, there are many open problems related to
safety, scalability, flexibility, and applicability that still need to be resolved. In this
section, we will identify the research gaps and discuss the potential areas where work
is required.
Pseudonym reuse: Existing PCSs typically specify when and how to change
pseudonyms but do not consider the frequency of this change. When the vehicle
rapidly changes pseudonyms, the given set of pseudonyms may exhaust, and the
vehicle is forced to repeat the given pseudonyms. This repetition increases trace-
ability. Also, when a vehicle uses the pseudonym for a longer duration, it adds to
traceability. There is a need to develop a mechanism that adequately deals with the
number of changes required for optimal performance and privacy. Secondly, the reuse
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of pseudonyms should be addressed carefully concerning location privacy. If the same
pseudonym is used by a vehicle, it will likely increase the chances of being traced.
Fixed area: Many schemes use fixed area (e.g. traffic lights at intersections)
to trigger pseudonym changes [21]. This has a limitation that such fixed areas for
changing pseudonyms may not lie in the route of a vehicle. This will prevent the
vehicle from changing pseudonyms for long periods and thus increase the traceability.
More resilient schemes are needed so all the vehicles can change pseudonyms at an
acceptable rate irrespective of trip route or location.
Safety/privacy trade-off : This is an issue for schemes that use radio silence [22]
prior to pseudonym change. Radio silence helps to increase confusion for the attacker,
but stopping communication at dense traffic areas increases the safety risk. Therefore,
future research can be directed toward finding an alternative to radio silence for
communication interruption or finding a trade-off between safety and privacy.
Security and Accountability : The exchange of the pseudonym increases location
privacy and adds confusion to adversary tracking. However, it is necessary to balance
strong privacy with the need to hold individuals accountable for malicious behaviour
and misuse. So, mechanisms to report misbehaviour to the authorities for further
processing must be implemented. When there is an internal adversary, then many of
the schemes fail to preserve privacy, for example, group-based schemes and encryp-
tion schemes. Thus, future work should consider protection against attacks from an
internal adversary.
Adaptive approaches : The flexibility and adaptability are essential as the vehicular
environments are highly dynamic. Trigger-based approaches generally work well.
However, these triggers should be applicable under dense and sparse traffic conditions
and for different road networks.
1.3 Motivation
The quantification of privacy has been a challenging task, and a multitude of vari-
ables in the vehicular environment further complicate the evaluation and comparison.
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The current state of the art pseudonym changing schemes lacks the consistent set of
assessment elements. There is a wide variety of techniques to change the pseudonyms;
however, the effectiveness of one PCS cannot be compared to another unless there
is a unified framework that allows a fair comparison. The existing PCSs consider
different road networks with changing traffic models, different adversary models with
varying attacking strengths and distinct privacy metrics. Additionally, the simulation
study of these PCSs has been carried out on different simulators. The inconsistency
in the simulation parameters and the simulation setup also plays a vital role because
it impacts the overall simulation mechanism. The majority of the existing schemes
consider the presence of the global passive adversary as the worst-case scenario. How-
ever, a local passive adversary is a more realistic type of attacker, and the literature
on PCSs lacks in evaluation in the presence of a local passive adversary.
We aim to bridge these gaps in the assessment of pseudonym changing schemes
by providing a comprehensive framework which deals with a consistent set of realistic
traffic and adversarial scenarios and uses common privacy metrics to compare the level
of privacy. We determine the attacking capabilities of a local passive adversary and
develop the intelligent attacker placement schemes accordingly. This strategic adver-
sary placement helps in understanding the threat level in its region of interest. There
is an absence of the intelligent local adversary in state of the art PCSs. The vehicular
network is highly dynamic, and the traffic patterns change frequently; therefore, the
mobility models are significant for the equitable assessment. In general, the underly-
ing factors to change the pseudonyms are directly related to the traffic scenario or, in
other cases, to the specific area. For this reason, the framework incorporates different
mobility models, which generally are based on the region, which impacts the layout of
the road network. Above all, the privacy assessment needs a consistent set of privacy
metrics that not only quantify the anonymity of the individual but also measure the
ability of the adversary to successfully track the vehicles when the vehicle is using
a PCS. We also propose a context-aware and traffic adaptive pseudonym changing
scheme aiming to increase the anonymity and minimize the tracking of the vehicle.
The inconsistency of the evaluation, as mentioned above, elements made it dif-
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ficult to quantify and compare PCSs. The integration of these building blocks in a
systematic manner helps in observing the differences, strengths and weaknesses when
PCSs are tested under a variety of simulation scenarios with a consistent set of models
and metrics. Eventually, this framework is a step towards supporting the industry
standards in measuring privacy with the identified evaluation models, methods and
metrics. As the auto industry enters the digital age, there will be an inherent conflict
of a highly regulated industry with the least regulated one. In digital, self-regulation
is the only approach to information security and privacy. In this case, an evaluation
framework to assess privacy schemes becomes essential for the Intelligent Transporta-
tion System’s ecosystem.
Our assessment led to identifying the privacy vulnerabilities and the limitations
which are present in the existing PCSs. There are multiple factors involved in the
evaluation, and when these PCSs are evaluated under similar circumstances, it reveals
the weaknesses and strengths of PCSs. Hence, there is a need to have a comprehensive
PCS which addresses these limitations and provides a higher level of privacy.
1.4 Research Contributions
The goal of this dissertation is essentially two-fold. First, it aims to develop a PCS
that addresses the limitations and vulnerabilities of existing schemes. It has better
performance under different traffic conditions and realistic adversary models in a
vehicular network. The second purpose of this dissertation is to provide a systematic
approach to help the research community for an equitable assessment of PCSs that
will ensure an effective comparison of different schemes with consistent models and
metrics. To accomplish this objective, the major contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We reviewed the current state of the research for improving location privacy
and determined the research gaps based on safety and privacy. After investi-
gating the existing pseudonym changing schemes, we classified and compared
these schemes to point out the differences, advantages and disadvantages. We
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discussed the privacy vulnerabilities, characteristics and design requirements of
pseudonym changing schemes.
• We constructed an equitable privacy assessment framework to compare a variety
of PCSs with a consistent set of network models, adversary models, and privacy
metrics. We proposed privacy metrics for evaluating the impact of the local
passive adversary.
• We proposed two intelligent adversary placements that aim to maximize the
degree of observation with limited capabilities. We evaluated the level of privacy
provided by several PCSs in the presence of a local passive adversary. We assess
the threat level, which indicates the effectiveness of the adversary.
• We proposed a pseudonym changing scheme that utilizes the context of the
vehicle and traffic patterns to leverage the optimum situation for changing
pseudonyms. We evaluated the privacy preserved by our proposed scheme as
compared to the existing schemes in the presence of a local adversary. For
this assessment, we have taken a consistent set of mobility models, adversary
models, privacy metrics and simulation parameters.
From the aforementioned contributions, the following publications have been pro-
duced:
• I. Saini, S. Saad, and A. Jaekel, “A Comprehensive Review of Pseudonym
Changing Strategies in Vehicular Networks.,” I. J. Network Security, vol. 21,
no. 5, pp. 785–796, 2019. (Chapter 2)
• I. Saini, S. Saad, and A. Jaekel, “Identifying Vulnerabilities and Attacking Ca-
pabilities Against Pseudonym Changing Schemes in VANET,” in Intelligent, Se-
cure, and Dependable Systems in Distributed and Cloud Environments, Cham,
2018, pp. 1–15. (Chapter 2,3)
• I. Saini, S. Saad, and A. Jaekel, “Evaluating the effectiveness of pseudonym
changing strategies for location privacy in a vehicular ad-hoc network,” Security
and Privacy, p. e68, May 2019, doi: 10.1002/spy2.68. (Chapter 3)
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• I. Saini, S. Saad, and A. Jaekel, “Speed Based Attacker Placement for Eval-
uating Location Privacy in VANET,” in Ad Hoc Networks, Cham, 2019, pp.
215–224. (Chapter 4)
• I. Saini, S. S. Ahmed and A. Jaekel, “Attacker Placement for Detecting Vulnera-
bilities of Pseudonym Change Strategies in VANET,” 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular
Technology Conference (VTC-Fall), Chicago, IL, USA, 2018, pp. 1-5. (Chapter
4)
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• In chapter 2, we investigate the current schemes of changing pseudonyms for
location privacy in VANET to identify the problems in different pseudonyms
changing schemes. We classified these schemes into two categories based on
infrastructure and user-based schemes. Also, we compared these schemes with
respect to techniques used for pseudonym change.
• In chapter 3, we developed a comprehensive framework for Equitable Privacy
Assessment Framework for simulation studies. We discussed various building
blocks of the proposed framework. We then provided a simulation road map
for the generation of consistent simulation results and one of the privacy assess-
ments of the existing PCSs.
• In Chapter 4, we present our proposed Intelligent Adversary Placements for
privacy evaluation under different traffic conditions.
• In Chapter 5, we introduce a new PCS, which is Context-Aware and Traffic
Adaptive. We compare the performance of the proposed approach with existing
techniques and in terms of both anonymity and tracking success rate.





In this chapter, we introduced the Vehicular Ad hoc Network and the privacy chal-
lenges in this network. Using DSRC technology and wireless communication tech-
nology, the vehicles communicate directly with each other and their surroundings to
provide safety and manage traffic congestion. The safety-critical messaging in this
vehicular communication introduces privacy risk. Vehicles use pseudonyms for anony-
mous authentication of Basic Safety Messages. To preserve privacy, there is a need
to change these pseudonyms. We discussed the vulnerabilities of current pseudonym
changing schemes and the motivation of this work. Then, we stated the goal of this





2.1.1 Mechanism for preserving privacy: Anonymization
V2V communication uses a safety message broadcast, which must be sent to other
vehicles while preserving the sender’s privacy. The message contains sensitive infor-
mation like personally identifiable information and real-time location. To prevent the
tracking of vehicles and inference of personal information, there are various meth-
ods such as hiding events, adding dummy events, obfuscation, and anonymization.
Among all these possible mechanisms, the only anonymization can be used for pro-
viding location privacy in vehicular networks. As for hiding, the events in V2V
communication would result in safety problems. Similarly, adding dummy events
will jeopardize the functioning of safety applications and increase security threats.
Obfuscation of the location information has a direct impact on the working of V2V
applications, as this is critical for various location danger warnings to notify the other
vehicles in the vicinity. Therefore, anonymization is a suitable option for preserving
privacy, which anonymizes the vehicle identities and prevents direct linking of the
personal identification information to a vehicle.
2.1.2 Conditional Anonymous Authentication
Complete anonymization may allow malicious vehicles to become a part of the net-
work, which directly affects the network’s operability. Vehicle authentication sup-
ports the security requirements for authentication and non-repudiation. Anonymous
authentication is a good idea because the users participating in the vehicular network
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should be legitimate and must have specific credentials like driver’s license, VIN, VID
of OBU and License plate. This information is used for identification purposes and
authenticates the user to be an authorized user. In this way, only the vehicles with
credentials can participate, and this eliminates the risk of unauthorized users in the
network. Therefore, the security risks for active security attacks are limited to insid-
ers. In the connected and autonomous vehicles, where the traffic and users rely on
trustworthy messages for the safety warnings, insider attacks from malicious users can
cause significant damage. There is a need for accountability, so such vehicles can be
tracked by the authorities and ultimately excluded from the network. Therefore, con-
ditional anonymous authentication is needed for the privacy-preserving mechanism.
It provides the network’s reliability and trust by authenticating authorized vehicles
while preserving their anonymity and also enables the revocation of the malicious
vehicle in case of misbehaviour.
2.1.3 Pseudonym Lifecycle
The pseudonym is an identifier that is used in place of the real identification of
the entity for anonymous communication. The pseudonyms in context to vehicular
communication are the short-term identifiers that are used in place of vehicle identifier
(VID), which is embedded in the On-Board Unit. Certificate Authority authorizes
all the vehicles and provides a set of pseudonyms that are not linkable to each other.
Still, the relationship among them can be proved by using the credential. Here,
credential means that each pseudonym has a certificate issued with it, which enables
the authentication of the vehicle and proves that this pseudonym is valid. In this way,
the vehicle is authorized. The pseudonyms are not only the substitute for the real
identity but also provide accountability to revoke the malicious users in the network.
Unlike other anonymous authentication mechanisms, the authorities maintain the
linking information of the real identity and the set of pseudonyms for each vehicle.
Therefore, a pseudonym serves as the best solution for providing anonymity and
unlinkability.
The general lifecycle of the pseudonym in the context of the vehicular environment
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Figure 2.1: Pseudonym Lifecycle
involves pseudonym issuance, pseudonym usage, pseudonym change, pseudonym res-
olution and pseudonym revocation. These five phases are interdependent and affect
the functioning of each other. The pseudonym issuance is implicitly dependent on
pseudonym resolution and how these identifiers are revoked. The pseudonym issued
to a vehicle should be accountable, pseudonym resolution and revocation work based
on accountability while the pseudonym change is dependent on the pseudonym usage.
Pseudonym Issuance
The real identity of the vehicle is the vehicle ID (VID), and it is provided by the de-
partment of motor vehicles when the vehicle is registered [23]. VID is securely stored
in the On-Board Unit of the vehicle [24]. VID is the signed certificate that allows the
unique identification of the vehicle. This identity is associated with information about
the driver and the vehicle. Therefore, the driver does not want to reveal VID and
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pseudonyms are used to preserve privacy. VID is used to authenticate the valid ve-
hicle, and after successful authentication, the vehicle can participate in the vehicular
network. For the pseudonym issuance process, a Trusted Authority(TA) is respon-
sible. This Trusted Authority can be a Certificate Authority(CA) or Pseudonym
Provider(PP). It would be a good idea to not fully trust one authority and distribute
the trust among different authorities, as a compromised, fully trusted authority can
misuse the information. The pseudonym issuing authority authenticates the vehicle
based on its VID and verifies the validity of the vehicle; that is, the vehicle should
not be revoked; issues pseudonyms. The process of pseudonym resolution is closely
related to the pseudonym issuance. Thus, the association of the pseudonym and iden-
tity is retained securely by a trusted authority [25]. More importantly, the resolution
information is critical and must be strongly protected from the security attack on
the infrastructure of authority. The pseudonyms have an expiry, which limits the
activation time or usage time. This limited validity ensures the prevention of the
Sybil attack.
Pseudonym Usage
The vehicle authenticates the message it sends, which helps the receiver to verify that
the message is from a valid vehicle. The pseudonym should not be revoked or expired.
The verification of the pseudonym is done locally, and most of the schemes allow the
certificate attachment with the message. This certificate ensures that the vehicle is
legitimate, and the pseudonym used by the sender is authentic. The verification pro-
cess imposes a problem for the vehicles. The total number of messages for verification
exponentially increases than the number of messages sent from the vehicle; in other
words, the received messages will be more than the number of messages sent. Hence,
the efficiency of real-time applications may be compromised.
Pseudonym Change
The vehicle cannot have a single pseudonym because it allows easy tracking. Also,
when a single-vehicle changes its pseudonym, an adversary can quickly notice that
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only one pseudonym is different and link the old and new pseudonyms [26]. The old
and new pseudonyms associated with a vehicle can be linked based on the location,
movement, actions and other parameters in the communication stack [27]. Therefore,
to avoid linkability, not only the pseudonyms need to change but also other identifiers
in the communication stack. The neighbouring vehicles can only provide sufficient
confusion for the attacker when the pseudonym change occurs at the same time or in
a synchronized manner. The frequency of the pseudonym change is crucial for real-
time safety applications’ performance, and it plays an essential role in the balance
of privacy and safety [28]. The frequency, place, time and situation for changing
pseudonyms are the open research issues that need more investigation [29].
Pseudonym Resolution
Trusted authority like Certificate Authority holds the resolution information (linking
pseudonyms to actual IDs) that can be provided to law enforcement representatives
when requested, e.g. in case of security attack and accidents. The trust can be
distributed among various authorities, for more security. For instance, the Law En-
forcement Authority (LEA) is responsible for requesting the Certificate Authority
(CA) to provide the resolution information to the Law Enforcement Representative.
This process may not be straightforward due to complex legal policies and laws.
Pseudonym Revocation
The pseudonyms of a misbehaving vehicle should be revoked, and the vehicle is ex-
cluded from vehicular communication [30]. Most of the existing schemes revoke only
one pseudonym of the vehicle, which is known to LEA at that time. Therefore, other
pseudonyms associated with the vehicle can still allow the vehicle to participate [31].
To revoke all the pseudonyms of the vehicle, VID of the vehicle should be revoked
with further denial of refills. This scheme still allows the vehicle to participate until
its current pseudonyms expire. Thus, effective pseudonym revocation is an open issue.
The revoked pseudonyms are collectively kept in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
and this list is distributed to all the authorized vehicles in the communication. If any
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message is received from the revoked vehicle, then the message is dropped. But the
management, distribution and update of CRL increase the complexity of the system.
Currently, the researchers are investing in the balance of privacy and practicality in
CRL management.
Pseudonym security requirements
There are various privacy attacks on the pseudonyms, which can be prevented if
proper measures are taken. In this section, we identify some characteristics of PCSs
to balance privacy requirements such as unlinkability and anonymity [32] with secu-
rity and accountability.
Location Privacy
Location information of an individual can be used to determine more relevant informa-
tion about that individual, which has a link to other services used by that individual.
Therefore, real-time location sensing poses a significant threat to user privacy. The
frequent trips to specific locations can reveal the home address and working place
easily. At the same time, the frequently visited site may also include hospitals, police
stations, or other destinations that show users’ social and personal circumstances.
Such information about the user’s behaviour may be used by a third party like an
insurance company for its benefits. To prevent the disclosure of information, either
the minimum possible information should be revealed in the broadcasting safety mes-
sages, or the driver must have authority to the extent of the revelation of data.
Conditional Anonymity
Within a set of potential senders, the message sender should be anonymous, but the
law enforcement should be able to resolve the identity in the case of misbehaviour.
Hence, conditional anonymity allows the anonymous message transfer and at the same
time ensures the identity resolution by law enforcement, which is needed for vehicular
networks [33].
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Accountability
The identity resolution mechanism can ensure the accountability of the vehicles partic-
ipating in the vehicular network. Identity resolution is a crucial aspect of conditional
anonymity. The anonymous authentication ensures that the participating vehicles
are legitimate. But there may be a situation when the authorized vehicle misbehaves,
and the authorities need to revoke this vehicle. The authorities must have a resolu-
tion mechanism to get the real identity of the anonymous vehicle from the current
anonymous identity for obtaining the real identity of this misbehaving vehicle, .
Distributed Trust among authorities
The authorities which are responsible for the pseudonym issuance, resolution and
revocation must not be fully trusted. The trust among these authorities should be
distributed so that a single compromised authority cannot reveal the information of
the vehicles [34]. The authorities may be a certificate authority, trusted authority,
revocation authority, law enforcement authority, and resolution authority. As in some
cases, there may be just one or two authorities that are fully trusted, and the informa-
tion is stored in a centralized manner. This can be dangerous since the compromised
centralized authority would reveal the information. Therefore, by distributing the
trust among authorities, the data can be secured. Not just one authority has an
entire set of information regarding a vehicle, and all the authority has a subset of
information which can only be revealed when requested by another authority.
Unlinkability
The new and old pseudonyms associated with a vehicle must not be linkable. If the
pseudonyms are linkable, then it may provide sufficient information to the adversary
to recognize the vehicle, thus becoming traceable.
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Fundamental Characteristics of a PCS
Unlinkability
Unlinkability is the anonymity property of two or more Items of Interest (IOI), which
the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not [35].
In a vehicular network, the adversary must not be able to correlate the changing
pseudonyms associated with the same vehicle. Pseudonyms of a vehicle must not show
a direct correlation with each other. For instance, when a vehicle uses the pseudonym,
say, 4321234, it changed it to 3421243 or changed from 212121 to 212122, 212123,
and so on. These kinds of correlations lead to direct tracking of the vehicle without
using the inference from other factors such as location information. Repetition of the
limited pseudonyms also leads to compromise of unlinkability.
Untraceability
Untraceability can be seen as the next step to prevent the disclosure of personal
information. Unlike unlinkability, this anonymity property addresses the association
of pseudonyms of the target vehicle by inferring the location and other meaningful
details in the vehicular communication. The determination of the correlation between
location and pseudonyms of the vehicle leads to track. Therefore, untraceability is to
keep this association unknown to the observer to inference attacks. Untraceability is
achievable by introducing more confusion factors for the adversary.
Confusion Factor
This should be an integral part of the technique used for the pseudonym change,
which prevents the direct inference of the location information of a vehicle. The
streaming information makes it easier for the adversary to figure out the mobility
tracks. Confusion factors introduce the required disruptions or alterations in the
continuous transmission of the data. Some of the confusion factors are:
a) encryption or radio silence for varying time duration to disrupt the constant
plain text message stream,
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b) changing pseudonym simultaneously with neighbouring vehicles to increase the
anonymity of the vehicle upon pseudonym change.
Safety-Privacy Trade-off
The balance of privacy and safety is essential. However, safety takes priority, which
restricts the use of specific techniques like radio silence. Radio silence can be one of
the most effective confusion factors as it breaks the stream of data. But the safety
applications heavily rely on the redundant data in real-time for warnings and alerts.
To use radio silence for PCS, one must carefully address its impact on the safety
applications [36].
Computationally Feasible
The vehicular communication has real-time constraints, and the delay in the process-
ing of computation of the safety messages has a direct implication on the safety of the
passengers. Therefore, the pseudonym change technique should be computationally
feasible as the OBUs have limited capacity compared to RSUs.
Compliance with Pseudonym Life cycle
Pseudonym change is a stage in the overall pseudonym life cycle, and the PCS should
be compatible mainly with the process of generation and revocation of pseudonyms.
Most of the existing schemes fit in the life cycle without any change. On the other
hand, some schemes may introduce a different mechanism for pseudonym generation
or may affect how pseudonyms are revoked from the network. In the latter case, it is
necessary to provide the potential changes in the life cycle.
General Design Requirements of PCS
A PCS should:
• Prevent location tracking and profile generation
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• Maintain untraceability, anonymity, unlinkability and perfect forward secrecy
of pseudonyms
• balance the frequency of pseudonym change for every vehicular trip (to have
multiple pseudonyms during a trip) and available number of pseudonyms (to
avoid exhaustion of available pseudonyms)
• Prevent repetition or duplicates of the pseudonyms by the same vehicle
• Consider different traffic scenarios based on congestion (dense or sparse) and
locality (urban or highway)
• Adaptive to the optimal level of privacy based on changing traffic environment
• Maintain the level of privacy in the presence of the intelligent passive adversary
• Preserve conditional privacy and provide accountability
Privacy Vulnerabilities
There are several vulnerabilities in the existing pseudonym changing schemes which
compromise the privacy of the driver.
Linking ability of location updates
Pseudonyms may have resolved the problem of the authentication of safety messages.
However, this temporary identifier can still link the location updates of the moving
vehicle if the temporary identifier remains for a long time in the network. Even
though the vehicle changes the pseudonym, the Spatio-temporal information helps
identify the vehicle by correlating the pseudonyms. Hence, the mobility tracing can
be prevented using an individual pseudonym for only a certain time during the trip
and then by changing the given pseudonyms frequently on a longer trip. In the last
decade, several PCS have been proposed. These schemes have different location pri-
vacy metrics and techniques. However, the effectiveness of these schemes has not
been evaluated against the location privacy attacks in different traffic scenarios such
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as urban, highway, or rural. It is important to determine which pseudonym changing
scheme applies to what kind of traffic scenario.
Frequency of pseudonym change
The pseudonyms are required to change within a time duration so that a longer eaves-
dropping session does not disclose the information associated with a complete trip. If
this happens often, the attacker can deduce the frequently visited places by a vehicle
and, therefore, can profile the driver based on the mobility patterns and routine ac-
tivities. Hence, the vehicles must change the pseudonym often so that attackers can
not track complete trips. On the other hand, some existing pseudonym schemes allow
the pseudonyms to change at a very high rate. This condition is suitable concerning
privacy, but it creates problems with the issuance and re-issuance of the pseudonyms
as every vehicle has a limited number of pseudonyms.
Effect of repetition
Many PCSs use a large number of pseudonyms as the changing frequency is higher.
It is not practical to use such a large number of pseudonyms with the limited capac-
ity of the OBU. The issuance of these temporary identifiers is also a major concern.
It has been suggested [37] that in the initial phase, the set of pseudonyms issued
to the vehicle must be valid for three years. Therefore, there is a limited number
of pseudonyms. If used with higher frequency, then the vehicle will exhaust all the
pseudonyms relatively sooner. Once the vehicle has used all the pseudonyms, it has
to repeat as a new set of pseudonyms will be issued after three years. The repeti-
tion is a privacy concern because the attacker records all the pseudonyms associated
with a vehicle, and repetition increases the tracking success. According to [37], 20
pseudonyms are active for a week. With the changing frequency of 5 minutes, all 20
pseudonyms will be within the knowledge of the attacker in continuous blocks of 100
minutes of eavesdropping.
Knowledge of Pseudonym Changing Scheme
The attackers can take advantage of having detailed information about PCS used by
the vehicles. When the adversary knows regarding when and where the pseudonyms
will be changed, it benefits the attacker in the placement of the equipment. If all the
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Figure 2.2: Classification of Pseudonym Schemes
vehicles are following the same scheme in all the scenarios, various factors like traffic
congestion, the fixed time interval for the change and intersection mix zones helps the
attacker to decide the most suitable location for placement for maximum coverage.
2.1.4 Classification of the Pseudonym Schemes
Based on the cryptographic mechanisms, the pseudonym schemes can be classified
into four categories as shown in Fig.2.2. The schemes are Asymmetric cryptography,
Identity-based cryptography, Group signatures, and Symmetric cryptography. Each
cryptographic scheme has some advantages and disadvantages. Effective pseudonym
schemes can be obtained by integrating the different schemes.
Asymmetric Cryptography
A set of public-key certificates is pre-loaded in the OBU with the corresponding key
pairs by the pseudonym issuing authority [38]. In this case, public key certificates
are used as pseudonyms after removing identifiable information. For authentication
purposes, the vehicle signs the message with its private key corresponding to the
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presently active pseudonym. Then, the message is sent along with the signature
and pseudonym certificate. When it is received, the receiver checks the validity of
the sender and its pseudonym by message signature, which can be obtained by the
pseudonym certificate. Although the VID of the sender remains unknown in this
process, which supports anonymity. The pseudonym issuance and refills depend on
the backend connectivity to the Trusted Authorities [39]. This enforces the condition
of the availability of the infrastructure all the time that may not be possible. The
asymmetric key may cause the communication and computational overhead as it
sends not only the message but also the signature and certificate. This overhead is
relatively more than the identity-based scheme and group signature scheme. In the
process of the revocation, the certificate revocation list is required. The problem may
arise to manage this list due to the increase in the size of the list [40]. The major
issues associated with asymmetric cryptography schemes are the scalability, increase
of certificate revocation list, pseudonym linking, pseudonym refill, computational and
communication overhead.
Identity Based Cryptography(IBC)
Identity-based authentication [41] allows implicit authentication as the vehicle’s iden-
tity works as the vehicle’s public key. It eliminates the requirement of the separate
public key certificate for the authenticity of the vehicle [42]. The private key is
generated from the vehicle’s identifier, which is used to sign a message similar to the
asymmetric cryptographic scheme. As the private key is a relative identifier of vehicle
and vehicle may generate on its own, it needs accountability. Therefore, a centralized,
fully trusted authority is responsible for the generation of the private keys and assign-
ment to respective vehicles. This authority has complete knowledge of the vehicle and
its system parameters. The authenticity of the vehicle is guaranteed because private
keys are provided to only the authorized vehicles by the authorities. The authenti-
cation characteristics of IBC are similar to that of the asymmetric key scheme. Still,
it does not involve certificates for essential public verification, and it cuts down the
number of verification and computational overhead caused by the verification pro-
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cess. The difference in two schemes lies in the mechanism of key generation. Hence,
IBC becomes a preferable choice as compared to the public key scheme in vehicular
networks [43]. However, the fully trusted authority may be vulnerable to security at-
tacks. The significant problems with this scheme are related to the constant vehicle’s
identifiers, which are issues for revocation and computational overhead.
Group Signature Scheme
The group signature scheme reduces the overhead caused by public keys and the
changing certificates [44]. Every group shares a common public key, and the group
managers provide the private keys to each group member. When a vehicle sends a
message, it sends the signature with it. This signature is verifiable with the group’s
public key, which ensures the validity of the vehicle. The anonymity preserves privacy
within the group as the messages, and the sending vehicle is verified by the group
signature [45] [46]. The Group signature scheme is similar to a public key scheme with
the difference of the issuance of the private key [47]. There is no strict requirement
of the availability of the infrastructure at all the time for the reason that the group
manager handles this process [48]. However, the group manager can not be fully
trusted as it can be part of the active security attack. The possession of complete
information about the vehicles in the group is quite unsafe. Another problem can be
noticed in the election of the group manager as the vehicles move at high speed; there
will be a frequent change of the group manager, which can decrease the effectiveness
of pseudonym management. The group signature scheme allows the scalability as a
result of pseudonym management based on the group size. However, the vehicular
environment is highly dynamic, causing critical computational overhead. Also, the
revocation process may undergo a compelling change in the whole group to update
the group public key.
Symmetric Cryptography Scheme
Unlike asymmetric cryptography, the symmetric cryptography is efficient with respect
to the communication and computational overhead [45]. The process of the symmetric
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key scheme is different and uses the message hash, and the secret key and issuance
process may differ [49]. All the valid vehicles have the same secret key, which is used
to verify the hash of the message. The method of obtaining a hash of the message
is identical to the sender and receiver side. The efficiency, in this case, comes with
some consequences. The secret key is common to the set of vehicles in vehicular
communication, which expands the size of the anonymity set [50]. Further, since
non-repudiation can not be achieved with secret key usage, accountability is not
possible to maintain.
2.1.5 Location Privacy and Pseudonym Change
The pseudonyms are subjected to change frequently to maintain the untraceability,
and this change should be carried out in a certain way, which supports the unlinka-
bility of the pseudonyms. Many of the schemes are proposed in the last decade, but
each of them has weaknesses which prevent the complete unlinkability, effects safety
applications and cause communication and computational overhead. So, there is a
need for a pseudonym changing scheme which addresses when, where and how to
change the pseudonym without any such weakness. The pseudonym authentication is
useful for privacy protection only when the pseudonyms change frequently and pro-
vide unlinkability. The unlinkability refers to the fact that the attacker should not
be able to link two pseudonyms of the individual vehicles. However, the pseudonyms
are the part of communication, and frequent changes of the pseudonym will adversely
affect the overall performance of the network communication. There is a need for the
development of PCS, which provides the unlinkability of the pseudonyms with opti-
mal communication performance and provides optimum location privacy. To find a
suitable approach, it is essential to find when, where, and how the pseudonyms should
change. Many proposed strategies use radio silence, encryption, triggers, area-based
mixing and context-based mixing. However, some schemes are not feasible due to
overall performance and overhead, while others lack the balance of safety and pri-
vacy.
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2.1.6 Existing Surveys
Several surveys for the security of the vehicular networks have been conducted. Sev-
eral surveys exist on the VANET [51] [52] [53] its communication techniques and
patterns [7], [54] requirements, architecture, challenges and standards [55], [51]. Most
of these surveys focus on the security attacks, security and privacy requirements [56],
intrusion detection systems [57], trust management [58], authentication schemes [59],
and pseudonym schemes [32]. Privacy requirements in VANET are extensively given
by Schaub [60]. Riley [59] has provided a survey of the authentication schemes for
VANET and has analyzed the privacy-preserving schemes by considering privacy met-
rics as anonymity. Raya et al. [61] addressed the security and privacy issues and
Krumm [26] outlined the issues of location privacy. Wiedersheim et al. [62] discussed
the challenges and issues of the location privacy and provided the idea of the dynamic
pseudonym schemes. Rebollo addresses privacy evaluation and metrics- Monedero et
al. [24] which suggests the privacy measurement as there are no standardization of the
privacy metrics in VANET. The location attacks are mentioned in [27] [28] [29]. The
survey of the pseudonym schemes [32] focuses on the various pseudonym mechanisms
with the complete pseudonym cycle, requirements, and challenges for each mecha-
nism. Boualouache [30] surveyed the PCS and has given the comparison amongst
them. We have presented the classification for the existing pseudonym changing
strategies based on the mix zone and mix context which helps in understanding the
difference of various strategies with respect to their approaches. For instance, some
strategies are user-centric and do not rely on the specific areas and infrastructure for
pseudonym change . In contrast, others use particular areas or road networks for
pseudonym change. The techniques like radio silence, triggers, encryption have an
impact on the performance as well as privacy. Therefore, we have discussed each of
the strategies, its advantages and disadvantages briefly. We have identified that dif-
ferent pseudonym changing strategies are evaluating privacy based on various metrics.
We have also discussed the research challenges of the pseudonym changing strategy
and direction for future work. This classification and comparison can guide the new
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researchers as well as help in the current research work to identify the drawbacks and
advantages of different strategies.
2.2 Privacy Attacks and Adversary Models
The pseudonym authentication scheme is suitable for providing anonymous authenti-
cation to the nodes in a vehicular environment. It maintains anonymity and preserves
the privacy of the user. However, the pseudonym schemes have certain loopholes
which can provide the attacker sufficient window to execute many attacks. First of
all, there are many proposed mechanisms for pseudonym issuance, usage, change, and
revocation. Yet there is not one of the mechanisms which can provide a completely
reliable and secure pseudonym lifecycle. There are different adversary models and
security attacks on the linking of pseudonyms, which are discussed below.
Pseudonym Linking Attack
The pseudonym is used in the safety message broadcast, which implies that the fre-
quent use of the same pseudonym can help identify the target vehicle. The linking
property of old and new pseudonyms can reveal the vehicle’s identity. Thus, the
pseudonym must be changed in such a way that any two of the pseudonyms associ-
ated with an individual vehicle do not relate. The two types of linking are described
in the next subsections.
Figure 2.3: Syntactic Linking attack
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Syntactic Linking
This type of linking is based on the neighbours of the vehicle. As illustrated in Fig 2.3,
the vehicle has two other vehicles in its vicinity, but at time t+1, only one vehicle
changes its pseudonym. The change in the pseudonym becomes obvious, and the
attacker can determine the target vehicle effortlessly.
It can be solved by the synchronous pseudonym change and it can be further
ensured that this change involves more vehicles. Since the vehicle density matters in
the syntactic linking, it can not change when it is isolated and must guarantee that it
has a certain number of vehicles around or passes through such areas where density
is high.
Figure 2.4: Semantic Linking attack
Semantic Linking
This type of linking is critical and involves the data in the message; therefore, it is
difficult to prevent as compared to syntactic linking. The information used in the
message is analyzed for finding the correlation between the two or more pseudonyms
(Fig. 2.4). The system parameters, identifiers, location and the movement of the
vehicle provide adequate information for linking the pseudonym. To avoid this linking,
mechanisms are required which prevent the location prediction by limiting access to
the safety messages for a specific time. This creates complications in the pseudonym
schemes, especially in the pseudonym changing phase.
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Classes of Adversaries
The adversary model is essential to consider the development of the robust pseudonym
mechanism. The main aim of the adversary is to link the pseudonyms, despite their
change, and break the anonymity of the user. The following are the types of adver-
saries.
Active vs Passive Adversary
The active adversary aims to alter the information in the message or inject new
messages in the network. The examples of such attacks are Man-in-the-Middle attack,
timing attack or broadcast tampering. The objective of the passive adversary, on the
other hand, is to gain information to track and profile the drivers, by eavesdropping
on messages. This kind of adversary is passive as it does not modify messages or
the message stream. Although the passive adversary typically does not disrupt the
ongoing communications in the network, the main concern with this kind of attack is
that it is tough to detect, because the adversary is merely listening to the unencrypted
messages and does not perform any alteration.
Global vs Local Adversary
The adversary can be global or local, based on the geographic area it can cover. The
global adversary can eavesdrop all the messages from all vehicles at all times, without
leaving any blind spot. In a real-world scenario, this would require the adversary
to place the equipment to cover a target geographic area, e.g. a city completely.
Considering the number of equipment that would be needed to achieve this, the
global adversary scenario is unlikely due to the prohibitive cost. However, many
privacy evaluation schemes adopt this model, as it is the strongest adversary and can
be used to model the “worst-case” situation.
The local adversary only has access to a limited number of attacking equipment,
each with a specified communication range. Therefore, it is generally not able to
eavesdrop on all vehicles in the area of interest. This is a much more realistic sce-
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nario, in terms of the adversary model. Due to the limitations on the number and
communication range of the eavesdropping equipment, the local adversary needs to
place these resources in a way that maximizes its attacking capabilities. Most PCSs
reported in the literature use a simple random placement of listening equipment. In
our work, we propose an intelligent local adversary model to investigate how the
strategic placement of a limited number of eavesdroppers affects successful vehicle
tracking in the presence of a local adversary.
Global Passive Adversary (GPA)
This adversary eavesdrops entire communication by using the radio receivers and
the infrastructure like RSU [26]. These radio receivers are deployed in a vast area
of interest. The adversary may also use cameras, but that will increase the cost
significantly. The biggest threat to pseudonym schemes is the global passive adversary,
as it is impossible to avoid this adversary to detect the changing pseudonyms. Each
event and message are traceable. Even with Mix Zones [50], GPA can link pseudonyms
semantically by predicting the location of the vehicle. It knows the location where
it enters Mix Zone and based on this information; it can predict the time taken in
the Mix Zone, and further, it can relate all the possible exit events to the expected
event [45].
Local Active Adversary
The capability of this adversary is limited in the area based on the transmission
range. The vehicles involved in vehicular communication are authenticated by an
authority [21]. But there may be some selfish vehicles that intend to manipulate the
messages or injects false information for their benefit. These are the participating
vehicles and can not be directly identified unless the misbehaviour is detected [63].
The collusion of such an active local adversary with the global passive adversary
brings the most challenging security problems. The privacy threats increase when
the active local adversary provides information regarding other legitimate vehicles to
the global passive adversary.
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2.3 Classification of Pseudonym Changing Schemes
The mix zone is an unobserved zone where the vehicles cannot be eavesdropped
due to radio silence and mix in such a way that after leaving the mix zone, they
are indistinguishable. In 2003, Beresford [64] introduced this concept in the context
of pervasive computing. To understand the mix zone, assume that the attacker has
installed the radio receivers at specific points on the road. Now, the attacker can
listen to network communication, especially the broadcasting beacons, which contain
sufficient information to know the vehicle’s movement and driving behaviour. This
knowledge can help an attacker predict when the identifiers are changed, and the
vehicles have different pseudonyms.
Mix Context: To mitigate the node movement’s predictability, there are a few
approaches; increasing the size of the mix zone, increasing silent periods, and increas-
ing the frequency of updates. But these may not be either feasible or safety effective
when implemented in the real world. In the case of longer silent periods, the chances
of accidents increase exponentially. The larger mix zones would still not promise that
all vehicles would pass through a certain area and be able to change the pseudonym.
All these conditions are critically important to consider the development of PCS.
Figure 2.5: Taxonomy of Pseudonym Changing Schemes
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2.3.1 General Mix Zone Schemes
The general mix zone schemes, as shown in Table 2.1, are infrastructure-based pseudonym
changing schemes. We point out the key concept of the scheme along with the chang-
ing strategy. This strategy determines when, where and how the pseudonyms are
changed. We indicate the evaluation method used in PCSs and inspect the problems
associated with the changing strategy.
In 2007, Buttyan [63] introduced the first idea of using a mix zone in the context
of vehicular networks. The mix zone is an area not controlled by the adversary, and
the pseudonyms can be changed without eavesdropping the attacker. This provides
unlinkability of the pseudonyms enabling location privacy. Buttyan evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of this kind of mix zone by using the success probability with the Bayesian
decision algorithm. The success probability is the successfully mapped vehicles from
the number of vehicles in the mix zone. The author emphasizes the minimum error
probability, which is provided by the Bayesian decision algorithm. The results of the
simulations carried out using MOVE and SUMO show that a stronger adversary can
obtain higher success probability. Also, there is a saturation of success probability at
60 percent due to changing mobility patterns at junctions with half of the controlled
junctions. In other words, if 50 percent of the intersections is compromised, then
there is a 60 percent of success probability of the linking pseudonyms.
Freudiger [21] proposed the first implementation of the mix zone in vehicular ad
hoc networks in 2007. According to Freudiger, the intersections are the mix zones
that have infrastructure like RSU that assist in the pseudonym change. Additionally,
the vehicles within mix zones encrypt the safety messages with the symmetric key
provided by the RSU. Therefore, this mix zone is also known as Cryptographic Mix
Zone(CMIX). The CMIX protocol has three phases in its life cycle: key establishment,
key forwarding, and critical update. Also, it has a mix zone and extended mix zone.
The entropy and success ratio of the vehicles are used as the privacy metrics. By
simulation on MATLAB, the Manhattan network is assessed with a highly dense
vehicular network. As entropy is used for evaluation, the tracking depends on the
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traffic density and its delay characteristics. The success ratio is inverse to the entropy,
which indicates that with increasing entropy, an attacker would not be able to link
pseudonyms successfully. The anonymity of the vehicle increases linearly, while the
success ratio of the adversary becomes negligible. This approach does not prevent
internal adversary, and it is not scalable and adaptable.
Carianha [65] addressed the vulnerability in the CMIX protocol and proposed an
effective approach that mitigates the risk. CMIX has encryption with the mixed zone,
and the shared key is available to the participating vehicles. This increases the risk
associated with the internal adversary who is authenticated for the vehicular network
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and, therefore, can have the shared key. The proposed scheme consists of a status
forwarding scheme limited to the neighbours and two of the overhead compensation
strategies. The evaluation of the given scheme is carried out on OMNET, SUMO, and
Veins based on the success rate. The results show that the success rate is directly
proportional to the number of vehicles in the mix zone. As this scheme extends
CMIX, it has a limitation of a fixed mix zone because vehicles may or may not pass
through such a mix zone.
OTIBAAGKA is the strategy to eliminate the use of fully trusted authorities in
the vehicular networks proposed by Zhang [67]. OTIBAAGKA stands for One Time
Identity Based Authenticated Asymmetric Group Key Agreement. It is used to create
CMIX while dealing with potential security attacks. He also suggested the benefit
of using a group key rather than using a shared key in CMIX. It makes the network
more dynamic and diverse. Even the internal adversary can have access to a few
vehicles in that group. Unlike other group schemes, it does not force the group to
change the group key when a vehicle leaves. The results based on the simulation on
NS2 shows the effectiveness of this scheme.
In 2011, Scheuer [66] proposed the idea of ProMix Zone(PMZ) that is the com-
munication proxy in the mix zone. The intersections of highways and crossroads are
the mix zones with the infrastructure units dedicated to pseudonym change. These
infrastructure units are proxies that are interconnected and have a pair of asymmetric
keys with a CA certificate. This proposal does not involve the pseudonym distribution
strategy. The simulation of PMZ on JAVA shows the results and dependencies. With
the growing number of vehicles in PMZ, the performance increases. The problem
may arise with the size of the beacon, which then causes bandwidth overhead. But
the author suggested that it can be resolved by using ECC. PMZ is scalable, while
its deployment is still fixed.
Boualouache [22] presented the idea of Silence and Swap at Signalized Intersec-
tion(S2SI), which would be the mix zone. The silence and swap are the two protocols
that together form a mix zone. The silence protocol creates a secure silent mix zone,
and swap protocol ensures the exchange of the pseudonyms within vehicles of that mix
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zone under a controlled RSU. The author argued that the radio silence in the mix zone
does not affect safety. Unlike other mix zones, it exchanges the pseudonyms among
vehicles rather than changing them for an individual vehicle. This might increase the
confusion for the adversary as tracking become difficult, but the communication stack
parameters are not changed, which can still enable the tracking. In addition to that,
there is another problem that may result in no change of pseudonym. There is a mod-
erate probability of a vehicle to not pass through such a signalized intersection that
prevent the vehicle from changing its pseudonym. The author evaluated the privacy
based on the entropy of the anonymity set size and the attacker’s success rate. More
privacy is offered with lesser success rate and higher entropy of anonymity set size.
The entropy of anonymity set depends on the arrival rate. With a small arrival rate,
the number of vehicles at signalized intersection increases, which increases entropy.
The simulation on OMNET, SUMO and VEINS gives the comparative analysis of
the CMIX and S2SI. According to the author, this scheme can avoid more than 60
percent of the signature verification as compared to CMIX strategy.
2.3.2 Dynamic User-Centric Mix Zone
Dynamic user-centric mix zone PCSs are similar to the general mix zone as both types
rely on infrastructure units for the pseudonym change. These PCSs have dynamic
triggers as compared to the general mix zone PCSs. Similar to general mix zone
PCSs, these PCSs have similar limitations based on the traffic situations.
Lu [68] suggested a pseudonym changing scheme using a mix zone where the
social spot acts as a mix zone. The social spots are the temporary aggregation places
where many vehicles stop by for a specific period. The locations can be the road
intersection at a red light and parking lot in public places. The anonymity set size is
the parameter for the evaluation of privacy. In the small social spot, the anonymity
would increase with the increase of anonymity set size. In other words, more of the
vehicles at intersection changing pseudonyms simultaneously, more the anonymity
provided. On the other hand, the massive social spots provide more anonymity when
the vehicle’s inter-arrival time is less, and the duration of the vehicle to stay in the
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mix zone is higher. The author provided the analysis for the privacy provided by
both the small and large social spots. Additionally, the numerical results are given
for further validation. This scheme is useful in a city environment, and it is scalable
and adaptable. However, it does not support the sparse vehicular networks.
Boualouache [69,70] introduced another mix zone concept with the existing road-
side infrastructure, which is dedicated to change the pseudonyms. The toll booth
and gas stations are examples of such a mix zone as these places provide high traffic
density, which helps in increasing anonymity set size. The scheme is named as Vehic-
ular Location Privacy Zone(VLPZ). By interrupting the continuous tracking for some
time, the pseudonyms can be changed securely without eavesdropping. The author
has given the analytical model for the proposed scheme and further supported with
the numerical analysis. In [70], the simulation results are presented based on a rep-
utation mechanism. SUMO, OMNET++, and VEINS are used for the simulation.
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The problem in this scheme can be caused by the silence provided within VLPZ,
which jeopardizes the safety communication. There is a need for a balance of safety
and privacy.
Ying [71] proposed a scheme that is user-centric and straightforward to implement.
Dynamic Mix-Zone for Location Privacy(DMLP) enables the vehicle to create a mix
zone on demand based on the traffic statistics, privacy level required and predicted
location of the vehicle. It is more adaptable, scalable and performs well in sparse
networks. The messages in mix zone are encrypted. The analysis shows the entropy
of the anonymity set size of the mix zone varies with changing network size. As the
scheme is compared with DLP, the size of the mix zone in DLP does not change, but
in the case of DMLP, it changes and increases the location privacy.
Recently, Arain [73] proposed a PCS which outperforms RPCLP, EPCS, and
MODP; this technique is known as Dynamic Pseudonym based multiple mix zone
(DPMM). It uses roadside infrastructure as RSU and a network of reported servers.
The method uses encryption and vehicle cooperation based on reputation techniques.
On the SUMO simulator, the delay characteristics and packet delivery ratio are mea-
sured and compared with the existing methods. The outcome demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of DMPP over RPCLP, MODP and EPCS.
2.3.3 Road Network Based Mix Zone
MobiMix is the idea presented by Palanisamy [74] in 2011 in the context of the
anonymization effectiveness and attack resilience. The author argues that the place-
ment of rectangular mix zones in the road network is vulnerable and careful measures
should be taken before its installation. Palanisamy also proposed a method for road
network mix zone placement, which provides location privacy. This method is eval-
uated on GTMobiSim with geographical maps on different scales. Besides, MobiMix
offers a high level of resilience to timing and transition attack. Later in 2012, the
author recognizes two significant vulnerabilities and evaluated the efficiency of the
prevention measures [75]. The vulnerabilities are found in the user mobility, which,
in some manner, is restricted as well as the road network characteristics and temporal
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and spatial information. In 2013, Palanisamy [76] demonstrated the risks associated
with the location privacy of the vehicles in the mix zones and how the location expo-
sure can be restricted to prevent timing and transition attacks.


















































Liu [78] suggested the concept of using multiple mix zones to prevent attacks
based on the side information provided by the user. Majorly, the author gives a
method to place the mix zone in such a manner that it reduces the privacy risks.
The idea of multiple mix zones is effective in breaking the continuity of the tracking
more frequently. Liu indicated three placement constraints of the mix zone and two
of the heuristic algorithms for the placement. The limitations are related to cost and
service, graph, and traffic. The scheme is analyzed based on information entropy. The
simulation analysis on CPLEX reveals that the traffic density increases the location
privacy as there are more vehicles for finding the best match.
2.3.4 General Mix Context
The mix context concept is different from the mix zone with respect to the usage of
infrastructure units. The Mix context schemes are independent of the specific location
where the infrastructure units are responsible for pseudonym change. In Table 2.4,
we discuss some of the early works in mix context schemes.
Li [79] proposed the idea of mix context for the first time in 2006. It is a user-
45
Chapter 2. Literature Review
centric approach that does not rely on a particular location, as in the mix zone. The
vehicles can independently determine when to change the pseudonyms. Unlike the mix
zone, mix context allows vehicles to decide when and where to change pseudonyms.
Now every vehicle on the road has a high probability of changing its pseudonym
as it does not need to pass through a mix zone for the change and depending on
user requirements for location privacy. The technique proposed by Li has two phases,
namely, swing and swap. Swing enables vehicles to synchronize updates loosely during
the change in their velocity, and swap is the extension of the swing. It facilitates
the exchanging of the pseudonyms among vehicles to increase location privacy. The
author evaluated the scheme with the entropy of anonymity set size as the privacy
metric under the random and restricted pedestrian mobility. This scheme uses a
random silent technique as the base and focuses on the prevention of the tracking
mitigation. The drawbacks of this scheme are that it makes use of silent periods,
and the exchange of pseudonyms needs accountability. Also, it is not reliable in a
non-cooperative environment.
The first implementation of the mix context was done in 2007 by Gerlach [80].
The context mix models arguably prevent vehicle tracking better than mix zone as
the vehicles are changing the pseudonyms independent of the location, which removes
the certainty of change at a particular location. Now freely moving vehicles change
pseudonyms while they are moving on the road and decide among themselves for
synchronized change. The location privacy significantly increases as the number of
vehicles increases. The observation from the simulation on JAVA using JIST/SWANS
and STRAW shows that the tracking time is affected due to traffic density. The
entropy of the anonymity set size is measured for the comparisons.
Liao [81] attempted to propose a scheme that allows the synchronous pseudonym
change. In this approach, the status information of the vehicle and the simultaneity
of the pseudonym change are considered. The author described the algorithm and
supported it by giving simulation results. The simultaneous change ensures the pre-
vention of the syntactic attacks in which the adversary cannot identify the vehicle
if numerous vehicles are changing their pseudonyms altogether. There is no risk to
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safety in this scheme as it does not use radio silence. The simulation is carried out
on C++ and STRAW by utilizing the evaluation metric as a success rate.
2.3.5 Trigger Based Mix Context
The most popular and dynamic PCSs are the Trigger based mix context schemes. As
shown in Table 2.5, the changing strategies of such PCSs vary based on the dynamic
Trigger used by the vehicle. These PCSs can effectively be used in places where
the infrastructure units are not present, and the vehicle has to protect itself from
long term tracking. Some of the example triggers are based on speed and number of
neighbouring vehicles.
Eckhoff [82] presented the usage of pseudonym pools, which enables the vehicles to
change their identities autonomously. The scheme can be enhanced with the slotted
time for static sized pseudonym pool. It also has an exchange of pseudonyms, which
increases location privacy exponentially. The mapping and tracking of the vehicles
become harder. The entropy of the anonymity set size is the privacy metric used for
evaluation of the scheme. The simulation setup uses SUMO, OMNET, and INET.
The drawback of the scheme is the accountability of the exchanged pseudonyms. The
authorities must have a new mapping to revocate the malicious user.
Song [83] proposed the concept of location privacy based on vehicular density.
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The pseudonyms of all the vehicles in vicinity change as the threshold reaches. There
is a vehicular threshold, which is the triggering factor. It is defined as k-1; that
is, if there are k-1 neighbours in the vicinity of the vehicle and they all can listen
to each other, then they all change the pseudonyms altogether. This simultaneous
change increases the confusion for the attacker. This scheme is evaluated based on
the success rate of the adversary. The author has compared AMOEBA and CMIX
schemes, and the simulation results support the comparison. It outperforms both
schemes with respect to the success rate. The simulation using NS2, SUMO, and
TRaNS shows the performance of the dense network. This scheme may not perform
well in sparse networks as it requires a certain number of the vehicular density around
the vehicle for pseudonym change. On the other hand, it applies to the vehicle to
vehicle communication. Buttyan [84] proposed a scheme that uses silent periods
based on the velocity of the vehicles. The pseudonym change would occur as the
vehicles’ velocity drops below 30 km/h, and the vehicles stop sending the beacons for
the duration when the vehicle is moving slowly. It makes this scheme independent
of the explicit synchronization and pseudonym change in a fixed place. This idea
of an implicit trigger is applicable in the traffic jams and at the red light where the
vehicle moves slowly; therefore, it is named as SLOW. The author also argues that
this scheme has no problem with safety applications, as slow-moving traffic has fewer
chances of accidents. The scheme’s analysis shows that the success rate is directly
related to the velocity and the density of the vehicles. The author has also shown
the effects on safety and computational complexity. The drawback of this scheme is
that the vehicles in the light traffic are more traceable as the change becomes obvious
when there are no or a few vehicles in the vicinity.
Eckoff [85] presented SlotSwap which is the extension of the work in [82]. This
scheme promises strong and affordable location privacy with consideration of the
network and computational overhead. The time-slotted pseudonym pools are used,
which regulate the change of the pseudonym based on the time slot and to make
the synchronized change, GPS signal is used. In this type of pseudonym pool, the
pseudonyms are reusable as they are bound to the particular time slot. The author
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has also proposed an idea of swapping the pseudonyms among the vehicles. But as the
scheme is suitable for V2V communication and not depending on the infrastructure,
this swapping may not be reported to the concerned authority for accountability
purposes. The simulations of SUMO, OMNET++, and INET provide the analysis
in two different urban and freeway scenarios. The results show that the sufficient
level of privacy is achievable with this scheme in dense and sparse scenarios based on
entropy, and the traffic overhead caused is insignificantly low.
Pan [86] proposed another trigger-based mechanism for pseudonym change, which
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depends on the number of neighbouring vehicles. As the cooperation of the vehicles
introduces higher anonymity, the author presented the idea of using the nearby vehi-
cles’ density as a trigger. Due to the reason that the synchronized change improves
location privacy, the proposed scheme allows implicit synchronization on V2V com-
munication. It is easy to implement, but it does not perform well in sparse networks.
The author provided a comparison of the not cooperating vehicular network to the
cooperative network in one and multi-lane. The results of the MATLAB simulations
show that with the anonymity set increment, the unlinkability increases increases the
location privacy. On the other hand, the scheme is deprived of the mechanism which
regulates the number of required updates of a pseudonym, which may sometimes
cause an overhead.
Ying [72] introduced a flexible approach that eliminates the problem of fixed
mix zones. It is called Pseudonym Changes based on Candidate-location-list (PCC).
This strategy uses the dynamic mix zones along with the candidate location list for
changing the pseudonyms. The list has various identifiers, and one of them tells
about the slot when the pseudonym is to be changed. As the vehicles maintain this
location list, it changes pseudonyms at the same time due to this identifier. It works
well in dense networks, but it may not be effective in light traffic as the adversary
may identify the vehicle after its updating due to fewer vehicles around and position
prediction. The author provided the beacon format for the candidate location list,
algorithm, and scheme analysis. The size of the anonymity set and the success rate
is used for the simulation comparison of the strategy CPN [86], DMLP [71], and
PCC [72].
Boualouache [87] has provided the concept of traffic awareness, which is used along
with radio silence. The scheme ensures safety and balances privacy and safety. The
scheme proposed is closely related to SLOW [84] as it monitors the traffic and chooses
a suitable place to change a pseudonym. The author suggests the congestion is the
best opportunity for updating. In real-time, it may cause a problem for the vehicles
which do not pass through a congested area and would not be able to change the
pseudonym.
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2.3.6 Group Based Mix Context
There is a set of PCSs in which the vehicles form a group on an ad hoc basis and then
carry out the pseudonym change. Table 2.6 summarizes three such group-based mix
context schemes. The common problem with these schemes is that it is challenging
to manage a group in a vehicular network environment.







































































CARAVAN/ AMOEBA is the approach for the location privacy proposed by
Sampigethaya [45] in 2005. The group of vehicles is formed based on broadcast
listening. If vehicles can listen to each other’s broadcasts, they will form a group
with a group manager. The group manager is a proxy for anonymous access. It
represents the entire group and communicates on behalf of its group as the group’s
vehicles are relative with respect to the velocity of the nearby vehicles. The analytical
and simulation results show that average anonymity in the freeway model increases
with an increase in anonymity set size [46]. The tracking time is reduced significantly
with an increase in the number of vehicles as more number of vehicles increase the
entropy. The author has presented a detailed mathematical analysis of the scheme
and step by step explanations of the simulation, which would help understand the
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scheme and its implementation. The only possible drawback of this scheme is the
group formation and silence of the group members. The group management in the
vehicular environment is challenging, and the silence risks safety even though it is for
a short duration.
Wasef [88] has introduced Random Encryption Periods for enhancing location pri-
vacy. The strategy uses Public Key Infrastructure along with probabilistic symmetric
key distribution. The symmetric key is the group based secret key, which is shared
among the neighbouring vehicles. The scheme promises reliability, efficiency, and scal-
ability. The author has provided a detailed analysis of the REP and supported with
the simulation on MATLAB by using the evaluation metric as anonymity set size.
The problem with this scheme arises with group communication, which is challenging
to manage in vehicular environments.
Weerasinghe [89] introduced the concept of a group based synchronized pseudonym
changing the protocol for the first time in 2011. The advantage of the scheme is that
it takes a more extensive anonymity set and higher entropy during the pseudonym
change. It is not only safety compliant but also prevents continuous tracking. The
group manager decides the time to change the pseudonym, and other group members
are informed, and after changing the pseudonym, the group is dissolved. Also, the
signal strength is changed as the pseudonym is changed. Weerasinghe added an
interesting idea of using a group identifier for a specific time between two of the
pseudonyms. It changes temporal and spatial properties as it adds confusion and
complicate the process for the tracking. The metrics used to evaluate the scheme
were anonymity set, the entropy of anonymity set, and tracking probability. The
simulation is performed on NS2 with Manhattan and the urban model.
2.4 Comparison of Pseudonym Changing Schemes
There are several schemes proposed for changing the pseudonym, but each scheme
has certain advantages and disadvantages. Some of them are applicable only in urban
areas, and some work well on freeways. Various mechanisms are used in the proposed
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schemes, which affect not only the performance and overhead but also the safety of
the vehicles. In this section, we discuss the different entities in the pseudonym change
and their benefits and effects with respect to location privacy.
Radio silence is strongly emphasized as it disrupts the continuous, frequent broad-
casts, which result in the untraceability of the vehicles if this silence period is used
for the pseudonym change and status change. The radio silence is effective because
the attacker can not use the information for linking two or more pseudonyms of the
vehicles; thus, it gives high location privacy. The concept of radio silence was first
introduced in 2006 by Li [74]and has been used in several other schemes in different
manner [43,67,70,71,74,82,84]. This privacy-preserving technique of silence may have
benefits. Still, it cannot avoid the risk posed by silence to the safety-related appli-
cations. The vehicular network aims to provide safety to the driver and passengers,
which must not be compromised. Therefore, there is a need for a balance between
privacy and safety.
Another significant factor which also disrupts the continuous eavesdropping and
tracking is the encryption. Encryption is not proposed for the entire communication
of the vehicular network. It is limited to certain zones or areas where all the vehicles
are high and feasible to change the pseudonyms. The encryption in such areas pro-
vides a security layer over vehicular communication, which cannot be listened to by
the attacker for some time. This idea of encryption is scalable, feasible to V2V com-
munication and can eliminate the use of infrastructure if required. The only threat
posed by encryption is an internal adversary. When the internal adversary helps a
global adversary, the tracking can be possible with a high success rate. The schemes
use encryption along with radio silence or in the mix zone [22,66,73,79].
Some schemes propose the exchange of the pseudonyms among the vehicles, which
helps in increasing the confusion for the adversary. These schemes do not give a
suitable mechanism to report these exchanges to the authorities. There is a need to
have the pseudonym to VID mapping for the revocation purpose in cases of security
attack. Thus, using the swapping technique significantly impact the overall working
of the pseudonym authentication. Accountability is mandatory, and there is a need
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to have swapping techniques with accountability. This may introduce a higher level
of location privacy.
In the vehicular environment, group management is critical due to the highly
dynamic network. The events of entering and exiting are fast and large in number,
which complicates the group management processes. Therefore, it may not be a
good idea to introduce grouping for the pseudonym change schemes as it then has to
deal with different other problems regarding the group in the network performance.
As many of the schemes are concerned with the anonymity set size, which is the
number of neighbouring vehicles, the schemes apply to dense scenarios like urban and
busy highways. There are no schemes that can protect the vehicles in light traffic
areas, mainly, because the adversary can predict the next possible location of the
vehicle and can relate the pseudonyms. Thus, there is a lack of location privacy in
sparse networks. The trigger-based techniques are excellent because it enables implicit
Trigger for a change of pseudonym. These are more effective as the adversary is not
aware when vehicles are changing pseudonyms, and it can only see the change, and
it is not easy to correlate after an implicit trigger. Another advantage is that even
if the adversary is monitoring the information, it does not know when exactly and
where the change is going to happen. Therefore, the prediction of such events is
challenging, with no critical related information. These allow more flexibility and
scalability to the pseudonym changing schemes. The possible drawback associated
with this technique is that if there are not enough vehicles, an adversary may trace
the vehicle. Therefore, the trigger technique is bound to the anonymity set size or
the number of neighbouring vehicles.
The mixed context schemes are based on the cooperative behaviour of the vehicles,
which is essential for V2V communication. Therefore, in such cases, if some of the
vehicles refuse to cooperate, others suffer as they cannot change their pseudonyms.
It is possible when there is a limit to the pseudonym change as the frequency of the
change must be bounded; otherwise, the vehicle either runs out of the pseudonyms or
may not be able to contact certificate authorities to obtain more of the pseudonyms.
Thus, non-cooperative behaviour harms the mixed context schemes.
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While comparing the schemes, it can be challenging to understand the effectiveness
as different schemes use different privacy metrics. When the evaluation is carried
out based on separate factors, it is a challenging task to analyze. There is no set
of standardized evaluation privacy metrics that resolve this problem, so different
schemes can be examined under a consistent set of metrics. Similarly, the schemes are
analyzed in diverse simulation platforms with various mobility and adversary models,
which cause the problem of understanding, evaluating, comparing and analyzing the
underlying idea and algorithm.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we pointed out that pseudonym change is part of the pseudonym life-
cycle, and the location privacy is dependent on how, when and where the pseudonyms
are changed. Next, we explained the privacy attacks and the types of adversary mod-
els. We reviewed the current state of art pseudonym changing schemes and provided
a taxonomy of these schemes. Next, we compared these schemes based on the factors
which play a vital role in introducing or preventing the privacy risk.
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An Equitable Privacy Assessment(EPA)
Framework
3.1 Need of EPA Framework
Many different PCSs have been proposed in recent years to determine under which
situations and how often a vehicle, or group of vehicles, should change its pseudonyms.
These schemes vary from one another in terms of their approaches and consider dif-
ferent privacy metrics, mobility models, adversary models and evaluation methods.
The proposed schemes use different assumptions and limitations as well as various
parameters and network models for simulations, making it very challenging to com-
pare and evaluate these schemes consistently, under the same conditions. To carry
out a fair and consistent evaluation of VANET location PCSs, it is necessary to have
a systematic approach in which all the aspects mentioned above are taken into con-
sideration. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no suitable framework
that allows comparison of the different schemes under the same mobility models and
adversary models, using the same set of privacy metrics. Therefore, there is a need for
a comprehensive simulation framework, where the feasibility and effectiveness of one
scheme can be tested against others under the same conditions and vehicular envi-
ronment. This will help identify the strengths and weaknesses of a particular scheme,
under different conditions and determine the trade-offs that may be necessary for dif-
ferent contexts. In this chapter, we propose an equitable privacy assessment (EPA)
framework for evaluating different pseudonym changing schemes. We first identify
the various components needed to create such a framework. We discuss our imple-
mentation of these building blocks, and finally, we use the proposed EPA framework
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to evaluate four existing PCSs.
Building Blocks of EPA Framework
Mobility Models: The mobility model describes the movement of vehicles in a vehicu-
lar network and is determined by two main factors - i) the road network topology and
ii) the vehicular traffic pattern. The road topology includes not only the geograph-
ical locations and distances of road segments but additional features such as traffic
lights, stop signs, speed limits etc. The traffic pattern is determined by the number
of vehicles, their average trip times, routes and speeds. Both of these factors can
have a significant impact on the performance of a PCS. The behaviour of the PCS
heavily depends on the traffic models. The level of achievable privacy varies with the
changing road network and the traffic situation.
Adversary Models: The adversary model describes the capabilities of the attacker.
For example, its geographical range (global or local), type of attack (active or pas-
sive), amount of available equipment, tracking algorithms used, and awareness of
traffic patterns and PCSs used to place attacking stations etc.
Privacy Metrics: The privacy metrics specify the criteria used to evaluate a PCS.
Many different metrics that have been used in the literature and selecting a suitable
metric is important as some PCSs perform well for one metric and may not perform
so well when using a different one. So, to have a fair comparison, it is important to
use a range of different metrics, rather than a single one.
3.2 Adversary model
In Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication, the periodic safety messages sent in plain
text can be captured using DSRC enabled devices. This information can be used in
various ways, depending on the objectives and capabilities of the attacker. Effective
PCSs should consider an accurate and realistic adversary model. The adversary
can be modelled based on different characteristics, such as the attack methodology,
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capabilities of the attacker and its geographical reach. In this section, we will consider
some important parameters that are typically used for adversary modelling.
In Chapter 2, we discussed that adversaries could be classified as active vs passive
or global vs local. The active adversary aims to alter the information in the message
or inject new messages in the network; the objective of the passive adversary, on the
other hand, is to gain information to track and profile the drivers, by eavesdropping
on messages. The global adversary can eavesdrop all the messages from all vehicles
at all times, without leaving any blind spot. In contrast, the local adversary has
limitations in terms of listening range and duration. As mentioned earlier, the global
adversary scenario is unlikely due to the prohibitive cost. However, many privacy
evaluation schemes adopt this model, as it is the strongest adversary and can be used
to model the “worst-case” situation. In the remainder of this thesis, we will be using
the local passive adversary model for privacy evaluation.
3.2.1 Tracking Approach
All the listening stations, placed at different locations, collect safety messages on the
channel and send it to a central vehicle tracker. The tracker uses the spatial-temporal
information for the prediction. Generally, multi-target tracking is used for tracking
and surveillance purposes. The idea is to sample the target positions periodically and
estimate the track of the goal using the measurement sequence. The association of the
position measurements reveal the track of the target. One such tracking algorithm is
Multi- Hypothesis Tracking [90], which relies on Kalman Filter [91]. In our work, we
have used a multi-target tracking algorithm, Nearest Neighbour Probabilistic Data
Association (NNPDA) [92], to track vehicles with anonymous message collection. If
a vehicle with the same pseudonym appears in the listening range of another eaves-
dropping station, the vehicle can directly correlate, thus, successfully track without
spatial-temporal inference. On the other hand, if the pseudonym is changed, then the
vehicle tracker predicts the target vehicle based on the location and time information.
It may accurately identify the target vehicle (successful tracking) or may observe it
as a new vehicle in the area as the vehicle is not identified with any of the previous
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tracked vehicles (unsuccessful tracking).
3.2.2 Factors affecting tracking ability
For successful tracking, the adversary needs to collect the streaming beacons almost
continuously. The link between the old and new pseudonyms can be lost with a
disruption, which reduces the chances of accurately correlating vehicle pseudonyms.
For the local passive adversary considered in this thesis, several essential factors can
affect vehicle tracking, as identified below.
• The number of vehicles changing pseudonyms simultaneously: A vehicle chang-
ing pseudonym alone is relatively easy to recognize. Therefore, PCSs, where
multiple vehicles cooperate to change pseudonyms together, tend to perform
better.
• Knowledge of PCS and traffic analysis: If the PCS is known to the attacker, the
attacker can exploit this knowledge to place the listening stations strategically.
Also, stations can be placed in high-traffic areas, if traffic patterns are known, to
eavesdrop on more vehicles. Certain PCSs lead to the repetition of pseudonyms,
which can also be exploited by the adversary.
• Eavesdropping duration: The longer the period over which BSMs are collected,
the more information is available to the attacker. Hence, tracking success in-
creases with the extended duration of eavesdropping. The longer tracking allows
the attacker to gain knowledge of the maximum possible number of pseudonyms,
visited places and chosen routes. If a PCS with a high frequency of pseudonym
change leads to the repetition of the pseudonyms, then the attacker can identify
the vehicle with minimum effort.
• Communication range of listening stations: The farther the vehicles are from the
attacking stations, the higher the chances of packet loss due to obstacle shad-
owing. The communication range of a typical RSU varies from 100 to 1000m.
A communication range of 300m is considered reliable, with having a relatively
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low packet drop ratio. On the other hand, a more extended communication
range allows eavesdropping of more number of vehicles. Therefore, the attacker
will select a listening radius, which drops very few packets, while still covering
a sufficiently large area.
• number of listening stations: An increased number of listening stations results
in complete coverage of the area of interest by reducing “gaps” where vehicles
are not monitored. Therefore, reducing the number of stations or their listening
range or both results in fewer BSM messages reaching the eavesdropping stations
and reduces successful vehicle tracking. Preliminary traffic analysis can help
an attacker, with a limited number of attacking equipment, to optimize the
selection of eavesdropping locations with respect to an available number of
equipment.
• Equipment placement Due to the limitations on the number and communication
range of the eavesdropping equipment, the local adversary needs to place these
resources in a way that maximizes its attacking capabilities. Most PCSs re-
ported in the literature use a simple random placement of listening equipment.
However, the strategic placement of a limited number of eavesdroppers can im-
prove successful vehicle tracking in the presence of a local adversary. Therefore,
a realistic approach to evaluating the performance of a PCS should incorporate
intelligent adversary placement strategies.
3.3 Privacy Metrics
The evaluation of privacy for VANET is a challenging task as it demands the quantifi-
cation of the context-based scenarios. Various metrics have been proposed for privacy
assessment, and these can be broadly classified into two categories based on their per-
spective - the user/vehicle who seeks privacy or the adversary who attempts to track
the vehicle. We have selected the following two metrics (one from each group) to
evaluate the different PCS.
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• entropy of the anonymity set, based on the vehicle’s perspective
• tracking success rate (TSR), based on the adversary’s perspective
3.3.1 Metrics Based on Vehicle’s Perspective
Anonymity Set
According to Pfitzmann [35],“To enable anonymity of a subject, there always has to
be an appropriate set of subjects with potentially the same attributes. This leads
to the first kind of a definition: Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is
not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set. The anonymity set is
the set of all possible subjects. With respect to actors, the anonymity set consists
of the subjects who might cause an action. With respect to access, the anonymity
set consists of the subjects which might be acted upon. The anonymity of a set of
subjects within a (potentially larger) anonymity set means that all these individual
subjects are not identifiable within this anonymity set.”
The Anonymity Set, AS, contains the number of vehicles among which the tar-
get vehicle is indistinguishable from other vehicles. In other words, AS consists of
all the vehicles in the network scenario that could potentially be the target vehicle
v. Typically, this includes a set of vehicles that are changing their pseudonyms at
the same time. As the number of vehicles in this set increases, it is expected that
it will be harder for the adversary to accurately identify the target vehicle. This
metric is straightforward, can be easily calculated and is often used by region or in-
frastructure bases PCSs, where vehicles which are in the same “Mix-Zone” change
their pseudonyms simultaneously [93]. On the other hand, AS is not an appropriate
metric for Mix-Context PCSs, which do not depend on a geographical area or infras-
tructure unit but allows vehicles to change the identifiers independently. In this case,
all vehicles that are changing the identifiers simultaneously, in the entire network,
are considered to belong to the Anonymity Set irrespective of their distance from the
target vehicle. The main drawback of using AS as a metric is that all vehicles in
the AS [94] are considered to be equally likely to be the target vehicle. This is not
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Figure 3.1: Example scenario to demonstrate Anonymity Set Size and Entropy of
Anonymity Set Size
a reasonable assumption if two vehicles that are far away from each other happen to
change their pseudonyms simultaneously. A vehicle that is far away but changing at
the same time is highly unlikely to be the target vehicle v. In other words, AS evalu-
ates the anonymity based only on the number of vehicles and does not use additional
relevant information such as location, speed and direction.
Entropy of Anonymity Set Size
A more useful metric is the entropy of the anonymity set, which also considers the
likelihood of a vehicle to be the target vehicle, and is based on the concept of entropy
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of random variables and processes related developed by Claude Shannon [95].
The Entropy H(v) of Anonymity Set for identifying a target vehicle v ∈ AS is




pi ∗ log2 pi (1)
where pi is the probability of node i to be the target vehicle v,∀i ∈ |AS|. Note
that adversary observes the pseudonyms, therefore, a node i is identified using the
pseudonym.
In the example of Fig. 3.1(a), the vehicle A is the only vehicle in the scenario
and the adversary notice pseudonym PN1. Here, i is the node as observed by an
adversary, which is (pseudonym) 1 and pi is the probability of 1 to be target vehicle
A because in this case, |AS| = 1, therefore the entropy will be zero. This indicates
that the adversary is certain that i is the identifier of A.
In Fig .3.1(b), we consider two vehicles, A and B, and the adversary observe new
pseudonyms PNA and PNB. We assume PNA and PNB are associated with vehicles
A and B, respectively. However, this is unknown to the adversary. A weak adversary
would consider that all the vehicles in AS are equally likely to be the target vehi-
cle irrespective of the distance, heading and other parameters. This means pi= 0.5
for both vehicles and H(vA) = 1. However, an intelligent adversary considers road
network constraints and the vehicle’s context, including location information. We
consider the following example to demonstrate this scenario. With the knowledge of
the previous position of A, the adversary can determine the likelihood of PNA being
the pseudonym of A is much higher (say 95%) than the chance of PNB being the
pseudonym of A (say 5%). Then H(vA), calculated using Eqn (1), will be approxi-
mately 0.28. This is a significant difference in the measurement of the level of privacy
from the user’s perspective.
In Fig. 3.1(c), we consider four vehicles, W, X, Y and Z, and calculate the
entropy for vehicle W. After a simultaneous pseudonym change, let PNW , PNX ,
PNY and PNZ be the new pseudonyms associated with W, X, Y, Z respectively
(which is unknown to the adversary). For a weak adversary, all four pseudonyms
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are equally likely to belong to the target vehicle W. Therefore, pi is 0.25 for each
pseudonym, resulting in H(vW ) = 2. On the other hand, a strong adversary observes
and distributes the probability based on the heading and speed, in Fig. 3.1(c), W
and X, are heading in the same direction, and W is right behind vehicle X. Taking
this into consideration the adversary calculates the probability distribution of PNW ,
PNX , PNY and PNZ being the new pseudonym of W, as pi=0.90, 0.70, 0.20, 0, which
results in H(vW )= 0.53. From this example, we see that Entropy of Anonymity Set
provides a more realistic measure when an intelligent adversary is considered, and we
have used this metric in our simulations.
3.3.2 Metrics Based on Adversary’s Perspective
In the literature, the proposed PCSs are evaluated using Success Rate, which is the
rate of successful tracking events defined based on various conditions of the adversary
model and proposed pseudonym changing schemes. Generally, the success rate is the
probability that the estimated vehicle corresponds to the target vehicle based on the
information collected from the collected safety messages. In [63], the adversary is
designed according to the mix zone. Therefore, it computes the probability p for an
existing event based on its entry and exit port.
Tracking Success Rate (TSR) and Global Tracking Success Rate (GTSR)
We define two metrics the Tracking Success Rate (TSR) and Global Tracking Success
Rate (GTSR) to measure how well vehicles can be tracked while using various PCSs.
These metrics are from the adversary’s point of view, so a higher value of TSR or
GTSR is better for the adversary and could point to a potential weakness in the PCS.
We use the following notation to define our metrics:
• V : Set of all vehicles in the simulation
• Nv: Total number of vehicles in the simulation, i.e. Nv = |V |.
• Na: Total number of vehicles that come within the listening range of at least
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one attacking station. We note that for a global adversary Na == Nv, while
for a local adversary Na ≤ Nv
• PNv: Set of distinct pseudonyms used by vehicle v ∈ V over a complete trip
from source to destination.
• cv: Number of pseudonyms changes carried out by vehicle v ∈ V over a complete
trip from source to destination.
• PNv,i: Specific pseudonym in use by vehicle v ∈ V after the ith pseudonym
change 1 ≤ i ≤ cv. PNv,0 corresponds to the initial pseudonym used by vehicle
v. We note that if a vehicle v does not repeat any pseudonyms over its entire
trip, then |PNv| = cv +1; however if pseudonyms are repeated then |PNv| ≤ cv.
For a vehicle v ∈ V undergoing a pseudonym change from PNv,i to PNv,i+1, we
consider the pseudonym change event to be tracked successfully if both the old and
new pseudonyms are associated with the same vehicle by the adversary. On the other
hand, an unsuccessful tracking event for vehicle v occurs if i) two pseudonyms used
by vehicle v are not recognized as belonging to the same vehicle by the adversary or
ii) a pseudonym belonging to a different vehicle is linked to vehicle v by the adversary.
We set sv = 1 if a vehicle v is successfully tracked over its entire trip, i.e. if
following conditions are both satisfied.
• There is a total of cv successful tracking events associated with v and
• There are no unsuccessful tracking events associated with v.
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We note that the impact of the intelligent placement strategies is expected to
be reflected in terms of higher GTSR values (but not necessarily higher TSR) when
using such schemes. This is because when listening stations are in areas with low
vehicle density, it may be easier to track the limited number of vehicles in its range
since fewer vehicles cause less confusion; however, overall, only a small percentage of
vehicles are being eavesdropped.
3.4 Simulation Setup
The simulation environment needed to evaluate the different pseudonym management
techniques (PMTs) consists of three main components:
• A network simulator
• A road traffic simulator (with the ability to communicate with the network
simulator)
• A privacy evaluation module
In our work we have used the following existing tools for each component: i)
OMNET++ [96], which is a discrete event simulator, for the network simulator,
ii) Simulation of Urban MO-bility (SUMO) [97] as the road traffic simulator and iii)
PREXT [98] for privacy evaluation. Fig. 3.2 shows a block diagram of our framework,
and in this section, we will discuss each component in more detail.
Figure 3.2: Vehicular Simulation Framework
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3.4.1 Network Simulator
The communication model has the following four layers: Application layer, Privacy
layer, Transport and Network layer, and Physical layer. For BSM, the application
layer sends the packet to the privacy layer, and at this layer, the pseudonym is as-
signed to the packet. The pseudonym could be the same as in the previous BSM
transmission or a new one. If a pseudonym change event is triggered based on the
PCS parameters, it is generated at the privacy layer and appended to the outgoing
BSM. When a packet is received, the receiver gets the safety message along with
the pseudonym. Each vehicle is set to emit beacon with a frequency of 10 Hz, and
the wireless communication is based on the IEEE 802.11p (DSRC) protocol. Sev-
eral factors influence the quality of wireless communication, such as interference and
channel fading. The BSM transmission may be affected by the signal shadowing ef-
fect in urban areas due to buildings and other vehicles on the road which block radio
propagation. We have used the simple obstacle shadowing model [99] to represent
interference in the communication channel due to buildings and other entities. This
model assumes that there is a minimum effect of the obstacle shadowing caused by
the buildings and infrastructures, allowing the eavesdropper to receive and track more
messages.
3.4.2 Road Traffic Simulator
We considered two types of road topologies - i) urban and ii) highway. The urban set-
ting has complex road topology, with many intersections and possible routes between
two points compared to the highway scenario. For the highway scenario, we consider
a single road segment with different entry and exit points. So, vehicle routes are more
predictable in highway scenarios, as the vehicles do not have many options to change
the trajectory except at an exit point. To obtain a realistic vehicle movement, we
have used random trip generation for urban traffic, which initializes the vehicles of
different origin/destination pairs and assigns routes for each trip. The movement of
vehicles can be further fine-tuned based on various properties such as traffic lights
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and high congestion areas. To connect network simulator and road traffic simulator,
we use Veins [100], which couples both OMNET++ and SUMO bidirectionally. This
allows direct control of the VANET communication not only on traffic levels but also
on the network level.
3.4.3 Privacy Evaluation
PREXT [98] provides a unified framework for the simulation of the PCSs in vehicular
networks. It contains the attacking modules that passively listen to all the safety
messages sent by all the active vehicles in the network. The listening stations placed
at different locations collect and send messages to a central vehicle tracker, where
the attacker tries to link old and new pseudonyms used by the same vehicle. The
adversary cannot receive all the messages from the vehicles, as each eavesdropping
station only covers a limited area. The tracker also has the capability of estimating
vehicle locations based on the spatial-temporal information, including speed, acceler-
ation, heading etc. This allows the attacker to link two pseudonyms associated with
the same vehicle potentially. However, this correlation is not always successful, and
the adversary may incorrectly link the changed pseudonym to another vehicle than
the target vehicle.
3.4.4 Observed PCSs
We have selected four of the leading pseudonym changing schemes for the analysis and
comparison of privacy. These PCSs are different from each other and do not follow the
same techniques for pseudonym change. There are many other proposed PCSs in the
literature, and most of the schemes use the radio silence for pseudonym change. The
use of radio silence in a PCS refers to the property that the vehicles do not broadcast
the Basic Safety Message for a certain period before changing their pseudonyms.
However, safety applications rely on a continuous stream of BSMs to alert the driver.
If the radio silence is longer than the beacon frequency, then it directly impacts safety.
We considered the PCSs, which either do not have radio silence or whose radio silence
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period is less than the beacon frequency. We selected a Periodical scheme because it is
one of the schemes with constant triggers, and also it is part of the proposed standard.
To observe the impact of radio silence, we observed the SLOW scheme, which is also
a User-oriented scheme. Cooperative is another user-oriented scheme that relies on
neighbouring vehicles, and CAPS is the context-aware scheme that also uses radio
silence. For the investigation of diverse schemes, we considered a range of different
approaches such as radio silence, user-centric, cooperative and context-based. This
allows examining the strengths and weaknesses of each scheme when tested with the
same simulation environment.
Periodic Scheme
The periodical PCS, introduced by Brecht et. al [37], has a static time-based trigger
and is proposed as an element of the emerging standards by USDOT. The vehicle
changes pseudonyms after every five minutes and selects a new pseudonym from a
pool of twenty active pseudonyms, which is valid for one week. The pool size is
restricted, so the pseudonyms allocated to a vehicle are not exhausted too quickly.
However, this means that if a vehicle is active for more than 100 minutes continu-
ously, it is forced to reuse the pseudonyms, and all pseudonyms in its weekly pool
are potentially disclosed to the adversary. Therefore, tracking becomes easier as the
adversary does not have to correlate the location and time information when it can
directly link the target vehicle using previously recorded pseudonyms. This scheme
focuses primarily on the limitation of the pseudonym usage.
Speed-Based Scheme: SLOW
In 2006, Li [79] introduced an approach with a dynamic speed-based trigger, which
allows moving vehicles to swap their identifiers. However, there is an accountability
problem in this scheme, and in 2009, Buttyan et al. proposed SLOW [84], another
speed based PCS, where pseudonym has changed the speed of the vehicle drops below
30 Km/hr. The vehicle uses radio silence for a short period before changing its
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pseudonym. Since this is not based on a fixed place or time, it creates increased
confusion for the adversary. The radio silence is not desirable for safety applications,
but with respect to the attacker, it prevents the continuous information broadcast
that reduces the success of the linking attack. One drawback of SLOW is that the
vehicle changes its identifier independently, without considering any neighbouring
vehicles. It is likely the vehicles in a congested area slow down together. However,
the scheme itself does not consider the adjacent vehicles. SLOW is a user-centric and
dynamic scheme, in which the vehicle changes the pseudonym without determining
the fixed area or periodic change. Therefore, the timing of the pseudonym change is
more randomized than the periodic changing scheme.
Density-based: Cooperative
The anonymity of a vehicle is directly related to the number of other vehicles in
its neighbourhood. In 2009, Song et al. [83] introduced the first scheme with the
vehicular density-based trigger. Later, Pan proposed a cooperative scheme called
CPN [86] in which the vehicles require the cooperation of the nearby vehicles to change
pseudonyms simultaneously. To increase anonymity, all the neighbouring vehicles
should change the pseudonym at the same time. There has to be at least one other
vehicle for this change to occur to mislead the tracker. As the number of vehicles in
the changing event increases, the level of tracking drops significantly as the level of
confusion increases. The main drawback of this scheme is that the pseudonym usage
is very high as compared to other schemes. When a vehicle is ready to change its
pseudonym, it sends the message for the change and forces nearby vehicles to change
at the same time. With the increasing number of neighbouring vehicles triggered
by the changing event, the same slot will have a larger anonymity set. This creates
confusion for the attacker and is more effective in the dense traffic scenarios where
vehicles are closer to each other. The changed pseudonym of the vehicle cannot be
resolved or correlated by the attacker.
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Context-based: CAPS
Context-based PCSs take into consideration the surrounding situation and change
pseudonyms by adapting to the current situation. CAPS [101] is a context-aware
scheme, where the vehicle decides when to change the pseudonym based on surround-
ing conditions and keeps radio silence for a limited time before the change. These
schemes introduce a trade-off between quality of service and traceability, due to radio
silence. Context-based PCSs can be regarded as more intelligent, and the identi-
fiers’ changes are less likely to correlate to the target vehicles. The vehicle indicates
the need to change pseudonyms, and as soon as another vehicle agrees to change
the pseudonym at the same time, two or more vehicles change the pseudonyms. It
increases the confusion for the attacker as two or more neighbouring vehicles are
changing the identifiers simultaneously.
3.5 Assessment of Existing Techniques
In this section, we have compared and analyzed four existing pseudonym changing
schemes using the following two widely accepted performance metrics: i) Tracking
Success Rate (TSR) and ii) Entropy of Anonymity Set. Such comparison is an im-
portant step that will ultimately allow a vehicle to choose the most appropriate
approach to meet its current needs. Table 3.1 shows the simulation parameters used
in evaluating each PCS.
The urban scenario, shown in Fig. 3.3 corresponds to a road network in the city
of Berlin. It has 1388 edges, and 576 junctions with a total area of 4x4 Km2 and the
average speed of the vehicle in the urban scenario is 50 Km/hr.
The highway scenario consists of a single straight road segment of 6 Km, with
multiple connecting edges, as shown in Fig. 3.4, with average vehicle speed set to
100 Km/hr. The average number of vehicles is 200, with a maximum trip time of 15
minutes per vehicle in both scenarios. This means that each vehicle remains active in
the simulation for a maximum of 900 seconds, and the total simulation time is 1200
seconds. Vehicles join the network at different times, which means not all the vehicles
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Parameter Value
Traffic scenarios Urban(U) and Highway(H)
Max. Speed 50Km/hr (U) and 100Km/hr(H)
Carrier frequency 5.890e9 Hz
OBU receiver sensitivity -89dBm
Transmission power 20mW
Bitrate 18Mbps





Simulation time 1200 sec
Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters
are present at the beginning and the end of the simulation.
3.5.1 Vehicle Density
Fig. 3.5 shows how the TSR varies with vehicle density for different PCSs. For
the periodic scheme, the TSR increases for both urban and highway scenario, since
more vehicles come in contact with listening stations. Also, more vehicles lead to road
congestion and slower speeds, making it more likely that pseudonyms will be repeated.
The highest TSR is observed for the periodic scheme in the highway scenario. This
is due to longer eavesdropping on the unidirectional traffic. The SLOW scheme
has overall less TSR than a periodic scheme, except in the urban scenario with 100
vehicles. Generally, it is difficult for the adversary to track the vehicles with the
SLOW scheme as there is radio silence. The tracking also becomes more difficult
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Figure 3.3: Simulated Urban Road Scenarios
Figure 3.4: Simulated Highway Road Scenarios
for the SLOW scheme when there is a more significant number of vehicles clustering
together as they are slowing down, e.g., 300 vehicles in urban scenarios. The TSR for
SLOW is generally lower, for the same number of vehicles, on highways compared to
urban roads. This is because, on highways, the vehicles do not slow down as much
as in urban scenarios, leading to fewer chances of monitoring pseudonym changes.
Therefore, the number of successful tracking events is relatively low in our simulations.
The cooperative scheme has moderate TSR in the urban scenario, and TSR de-
creases with vehicle density, as the increased number of vehicles introduces more
confusion for the attacker when more vehicles change their pseudonyms at the same
time. CAPS is a context-aware scheme that allows the change of pseudonym with
high attacker confusion due to radio silence and large anonymity set. It has relatively
lower TSR in the urban scenario with a sudden decline of TSR with high vehicle den-
sity. While TSR of highway increases gradually due to the overall increased number
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Figure 3.5: Tracking Success Rate with varying vehicle density
of successful tracking events, an increased number of vehicles are in the adversary’s
range. In general, TSR for CAPS scheme is the lowest of the four schemes; in both
the scenarios, due to radio silence, there are more unsuccessful tracking events.
Fig. 3.6 shows how the entropy of the anonymity set AS varies with vehicle
density for different PCSs. The entropy remains low for the SLOW scheme because
the vehicles approaching the red lights and traffic congestion are the only vehicles that
change the pseudonyms. With the knowledge of PCS used, the adversary would not
have enough confusion as the vehicles are not surrounded by other slow vehicles due to
random trips. Even with increased vehicle density, the entropy remains low. This is
because our simulations have used random trips from different entry and exit points.
Therefore, the vehicles are spread out over the whole road network. So when a vehicle
is slowing in our mobility model, it is usually far from other vehicles, making the
correlation of the new and old pseudonyms more predictable. The entropy would grow
for the SLOW scheme if more number of vehicles in the mobility model are clustered
together and always slow down together. This creates confusion for the attacker due
to the radio silence of multiple vehicles within a short geographical distance. For
the same reason, the cooperative and CAPS scheme’s entropy remains high as the
randomness is relatively high in these schemes when a target vehicle is tracked. This
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Figure 3.6: Entropy of AS with varying vehicle density
randomness is introduced by the set of vehicles changing pseudonyms together and
the radio silence maintained by more than two vehicles in cooperative and CAPS
schemes. For the periodic scheme, the anonymity set entropy is high in the urban
scenario as the anonymity set consists of the total number of active vehicles that are
changing pseudonyms nearly at the same time. The underlying traffic movement plays
a role in this case. In our observation, there are sets of vehicles close to each other
when they periodically change pseudonyms. In the highway scenario, the entropy
is comparatively lower than the urban scenario because there is less randomness on
the highway. The urban area consists of a mesh road network where more vehicles
are moving in close range of each other, decreasing the predictability as compared
to straight highway road where the predictability increases due to fixed speed of the
vehicle. Therefore, even though the anonymity set contains all the moving vehicles,
the distant vehicles from the target vehicle on the highway are less likely to be the
estimated target vehicle.
3.5.2 Trip Time
The trip duration of the vehicle is another important factor in assessing privacy
protection. For our simulations based on varying trip time, we considered 15, 30 and
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60 minutes of average trip time in both urban and highway scenarios, with vehicle
density of 200 and 5 attacking stations. Some trips are shorter, and others are longer
than the considered average time. Therefore, the overall simulation time varies in
this case. Fig. 3.7 shows how the TSR and entropy of the anonymity set AS vary
with trip time for different PCS.
Figure 3.7: Tracking Success Rate with varying trip time
When the PCS allows the repetition of the pseudonyms due to a limited num-
ber of temporary identifiers, the attacker can accumulate knowledge of previously
used pseudonyms, which increases TSR. In the periodic scheme, a limited number of
pseudonyms are allotted to each vehicle to be used over time. The TSR for periodic
scheme increases steadily with trip time and is significantly high when the trip time
is longer since the likelihood of pseudonym reuse increases with trip duration. The
SLOW scheme shows lower TSR compared to the periodic scheme, in both urban and
highway scenario. The highways have relatively fewer pseudonym changes as vehicles
slow down only due to congestion or after taking the exit. Therefore, the overall num-
ber of successful tracking events for SLOW is lower in random highway placement.
For both cooperative and CAPS schemes, the trip time seems to have minimal effect
on TSR. CAPS scheme results in the lowest TSR, with the cooperative scheme as the
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next best case. In Fig. 3.8, we observe the entropy of anonymity set with varying
Figure 3.8: Entropy of AS with varying trip time
trip time. The entropy for the periodic case is moderate for the urban scenario but
lower for the highway. This results in higher TSR for highways as the duration has
no significant impact on the anonymity set size. The entropy remains low for all
cases, with very little chance for the SLOW scheme. The cooperative scheme shows
very high entropy in all the observed cases, due to the simultaneous change of the
identifiers. The entropy for CAPS also remains consistently high, but lower than co-
operative for all cases. In the cooperative scheme, the anonymity set includes all the
vehicles changing pseudonyms and more vehicles involved than the CAPS scheme.
This is why the entropy for cooperative is higher as compared to the CAPS scheme.
Interestingly, TSR for the cooperative case is higher than CAPS with high entropy
of AS; this is due to the radio silence of CAPS scheme, which introduces additional
confusion for the adversary. This shows that more vehicles are suitable for increasing
anonymity, which is good from the user’s perspective. For the adversary, radio silence
is more challenging, decreasing the tracking success rate.
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Figure 3.9: Tracking Success Rate with varying eavesdropping stations
3.5.3 Number of Eavesdropping Stations
Fig. 3.9 shows how the TSR of the anonymity set AS varies with the number of
eavesdropping stations for different PCS. For these simulations, we considered 3, 5
and 7 eavesdropping stations for urban scenarios and 5, 7 and 9 for highway scenarios,
each with each 300m of range. For both urban and highway, we simulated 200 vehicles
with 15 minutes of trip time per vehicle.
With more eavesdropping stations, the attacker can expand its listening area and
record the pseudonym changes, as vehicles broadcast their safety messages. As ex-
pected, the TSR increases consistently for all approaches, as the number of eavesdrop-
ping stations increases. As before, the CAPS scheme has the lowest TSR, followed
by cooperative and SLOW schemes. The periodic scheme performs the worst in all
cases.
The entropy of the anonymity set, in Fig. 3.10 remains high for the cooperative
and CAPS scheme, while it is moderate for the periodic scheme and low for SLOW
schemes. The context-aware scheme provides the best privacy protection level on the
highways with high entropy and the lowest TSR with five attacking stations. The
cooperative scheme has moderate TSR with high entropy of AS, which shows that the
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Figure 3.10: Entropy of AS with varying eavesdropping stations
scheme promises the anonymity on the user side. However, the way the pseudonyms
are changed, the linkability of new and old pseudonyms becomes evident for the
attacker in many cases. The context-aware approach (CAPS) gives a high entropy
and low tracking rate. This is due to a reasonable time of radio silence, which provides
confusion as well as randomness. In context-aware schemes, vehicles are usually
surrounded by other vehicles, which will simultaneously change their identifiers. On
the other hand, there is radio silence in SLOW, but the vehicle may be far from other
vehicles when changing its pseudonym. This allows the attacker to track it more
easily, compared to vehicles using a context-aware scheme.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the need for an equitable privacy assessment framework.
We identified the building blocks of this framework. We described the adversary
model, the tracking approach used for tracking the vehicles and the factors affecting
the tracking ability. We explained the privacy metrics from vehicle’s and adversary’s
perspectives. We presented a set of simulators that facilitate privacy evaluation in
vehicular networks. Using this simulation setup, we compared and analyzed four
existing pseudonym changing schemes using two of the privacy metrics.
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Intelligent Adversary Placements for Pri-
vacy Evaluation in VANET
4.1 Introduction
The existing attack modelling in PREXT [98] is the global passive adversary who
can eavesdrop all the messages without packet loss. Such an adversary demands
an extensive network of the roadside units, which would require either control on
the existing infrastructure or deployment of the new equipment. Therefore, it is
considered to be very challenging to execute a global passive adversary. On the
other hand, local attacks are feasible with less equipment. Therefore, the scope of
our observation is the local passive attacking scenarios. For local adversary, we have
considered that the attacking stations are placed strategically so that the attacker can
take advantage of the dense traffic and frequently chosen routes, which are usually in
the center of the city. The limited capabilities of the attacker may affect the urban
areas differently than the highways. Also, the local attacks are targeted to the busy
areas within the city as the attacker wants to use a minimum number of attacking
stations to reduce the overall cost. So we have simulated the local attack with varying
number of attacking stations for different pseudonym changing schemes. It reveals
the attacking capabilities and the level of privacy protection provided by various
schemes. PREXT involves the global attacking module, which passively listens to the
safety messages sent by vehicles. We have altered the attacking capabilities in this
framework. We have placed the listening stations at the selected observation points
based on preliminary traffic analysis. All the listening stations placed at different
locations collect messages and send them to a central tracker where the attacker
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determines the relation of the old and new pseudonyms used by the same vehicle. The
attacker is not able to receive all the messages from the vehicles as one eavesdropping
station covers a limited area; hence, when the vehicles are in the range of one of the
attacking stations and change the pseudonym, then the attacker can directly correlate
the changed pseudonym. The tracker also has the capability of estimating based
on the spatial-temporal relation. As the vehicle moves on a road and in a specific
direction at a time, the vehicle’s speed helps in determining the vehicle’s movement
in a given time, which allows the determination of the same vehicle, which previously
had a pseudonym P1. When it enters the range of the new attacking station, it has
a new pseudonym P2. This correlation of the pseudonyms is observable only because
of the continuous Basic Safety Messages and the smaller changing frequency of the
pseudonyms.
We propose two traffic-aware attacker placement strategies that can be used to
select the most advantageous eavesdropping locations for attacking stations intelli-
gently. We show how intelligent attacker placements can affect the performance of
different PCS and analyze the conditions under which privacy is most likely to be
compromised.
Objectives
• A distance based attacker placement scheme (DBAP)
• A novel speed based attacker placement scheme (SBAP)
• A comprehensive comparative evaluation of different PCSs using the proposed
schemes and random attacker placement, for different traffic conditions, using
common metrics.
4.2 Intelligent Attacker placement
We consider a local passive adversary, with a limited number of eavesdropping stations
that have a specified listening range. In this context, the goal of the adversary is
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to target the positions with high vehicle density and eavesdrop on the maximum
number of vehicles. The placement algorithms use knowledge of long term traffic
patterns to help select potential locations for adversary placement. Such information
can be easily obtained from public sources to retrieve real-time traffic information
using a variety of web applications such as Google Maps, so the algorithms are not
dependent on any specialized or proprietary data. The collected traffic information
can include the most congested road segments or intersections, time of the day, the
usual duration of congestion and length of the road segments with congestion. An
adversary accumulates this information over time to understand the underlying traffic
patterns in the region, which allows it to make intelligent choices when placing the
listening stations. Furthermore, prior knowledge of the PCS being used can directly
affect the strategic placement of the eavesdropping stations. For example, if the
adversary is aware that Periodic scheme is being used and pseudonyms are changed
every five minutes [37], the distance between stations can be adjusted for continuous
linking of the changing pseudonyms.
Most PCSs reported in the literature typically assume a simplistic, random place-
ment of attackers, which may not provide an accurate measure of its performance
under more realistic conditions. In this section, we present two new attacker place-
ment strategies - i) distance based attacker placement (DBAP) and ii) speed based at-
tacker placement (SBAP) for selecting the locations where attacking stations should
be placed to increase the chances of successful vehicle tracking. For both approaches,
this is accomplished by selecting locations where
1. attacking stations can listen to beacons from many vehicles and
2. pseudonym changes are likely to occur
It is expected that an intelligent adversary can make use of publicly available
information to improve its chances of successfully tracking vehicles. Therefore, the
various PCSs need to be evaluated for such placement schemes, rather than simple
random placement, for a more accurate measure of performance. Both approaches
have an initialization step during which parameters such as the number of available
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equipment, their communication range and the pseudonym change frequency (used
for periodic pseudonym changes) are specified. Long term traffic patterns are also
analyzed to guide attacker placement.
4.2.1 Distance Based Attacker Placement
A brief overview of our proposed distance based attacker placement (DBAP) algorithm
is given below. In this approach, the attacker chooses certain road segments, based
on traffic conditions and places attacking stations at specified distances along the
selected segments.
Algorithm 1 Distance based attacking placement algorithm
Input: Number of available equipment for tracking the vehicles (n) and PN change
frequency (f )
Output: Adversary spacing
1: Based on traffic patterns select
a. Target destination (T)
b. a set P of potential starting points for routes, where |P | = k and pi ∈ P is the
ith starting point.
2: Calculate spacing between adversary positions (d)






4: number of adversaries to use.






e b. Set d=d’
6: for pi ∈ P do
7: Place adversary equipment with space d along route from pi to T.
First, we select a suitable target destination T (step 1a), which is likely to be
visited by a large number of vehicles. T is typically a high-traffic road for urban
scenarios, often near the city center, while it is always taken as the last segment of
the highway for highways. Next we identify a set P of k potential starting points
(step 1b), where pi ∈ P and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The road segments from pi to T are selected
for adversary placement. The goal is to select roads with high traffic so that more
vehicles will be exposed to attacking stations. For highways, k = 1 and p1 is the initial
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segment of the highway under consideration. In other words, we do not consider the
highway on or off-ramps, but rather treat it as a single road segment.
After selecting the routes, we determine the maximum distance (d) between suc-
cessive attacking stations along the selected routes (step 2) to achieve full coverage
along these routes. The value of d can depend on several factors, such as vehicle
speeds, the frequency of pseudonym changes and the communication range of the
attacking stations. Next, in step 3, we determine the minimum number of attacking
stations (Nmin) needed for covering the routes, based on d. If the number of available
stations (n) is higher than Nmin, then d is set to be the attacker distance. On the
other hand, if n ≤ Nmin, we calculate an updated attacker spacing d′ (step 4-5), where
d′ > d and then set d = d′. It is important to note that increasing the attacker spacing
may have a negative impact on the ability to track vehicles. Finally, the stations are
placed along each selected route with a distance of d between two adjacent stations
(step 6-7).
4.2.2 Speed Based Attacker Placement
The DBAP scheme in the previous section works well for periodic pseudonym change,
but may not be effective for a speed-based PCS. In speed based PCS, the pseudonym
changes when the speed falls below a given threshold, for example, at red light in-
tersections and stop signs or along sections of roads that experience high traffic con-
gestion. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to an intersection with a traffic
light or stop sign as a Traffic/Stop Intersection (TSI) and congested road segments
as high traffic sections (HTS). TSI and HTS are excellent candidate locations for
placing attackers when vehicles are using speed based PCS. However, it might not
be feasible to place attacking stations on all TSI or very closely spaced along with
an HTS. The SBAP algorithm given below identifies potential attacker positions so
that more vehicles can be tracked with relatively few attacking stations. Monitoring
a longer stretch of the road helps in the correlation of the old and new pseudonyms of
a vehicle, especially when the vehicles do not change the pseudonyms very frequently.
Therefore, we consider relatively long segments (at least 15km) and have high traffic
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density.
Based on the long term traffic patterns, two types of road segments are selected
for monitoring:
• A set S1 of urban roads segments where attackers will be placed based on TSI
locations, where |S1| = k and si ∈ S is the ith road segment and
• A set S2 of road segments (primarily highways, but may contain some urban
roads as well), where attackers will be placed based on traffic congestion.
Algorithm 2 Speed based attacking algorithm
Input: Number (n) and Communication range (rcomm) of available attacking stations
for vehicle tracking
Output: Adversary locations
1: Repeat steps 2 - 13 until all selected locations are covered or there is no more
available attacker equipment
2: for all si ∈ S1 do
3: locA= location of the first TSI of si
4: Repeat steps 5-8 until locA ∈ si == False:
5: Place attacker at locA
6: dnext=distance from locA to the next TSI on si after locA
7: dinter= max{dnext, 2.rcomm}
8: locA = locA + dinter
9: for all HTSi ∈ S2 do
10: locA=location of first attacker in HTSi
11: Repeat 13-14 until locA ∈ HTSi == False
12: Place attacker at locA
13: locA = locA + 2 · rcomm
Attacking stations are placed one by one on the selected road segments, based
on TSI (steps 2-9) and HTS (steps 10-15), until all positions of interest have been
covered or the maximum number of stations (n) have been used. For each selected
road segment si on an urban road, the current attacker location is initially set to the
first TSI segment (step 3). If the specified attacker location (locA) falls within the
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current road segment si, (step 4) then attacking equipment is placed at locA (step 5).
Once the equipment has been placed, steps 6-8 determine the next location be used
for placing additional equipment on the current segment. If the distance from the
current TSI to the next one is greater than 2.rcomm, then an attacker is placed at the
next TSI. Otherwise, next attacker is placed a location 2.rcomm from the current TSI
on the road segment si. This placement strategy allows all the TSI along the road
segment to be covered using the fewest possible attackers.
Once attackers have been placed at intersections, we try to place any additional
equipment along with congested road segments, i.e. HTSi ∈ S2 (steps 10-14). The
first attacker along an HTS is placed at a location that is at a distance of 2 · rcomm
from the nearest station. Subsequently, equipment is placed uniformly at intervals of
2 · rcomm along the entire segment.
4.3 Simulation and Analysis
The objective of this simulation is to compare four of the existing PCSs with con-
sistent set of Mobility Models, Adversary Models and Privacy Metrics according to
EPA framework as discussed in Section 3.1.
• Observed PCSs: Periodic [37], SLOW [84], CPN [86] and CAPS [101]
• Adversary Placement schemes: Random, DBAP and SBAP
• Mobility Model- Traffic Scenario: Urban or Highway
• Mobility Model- Vehicle Densities: 100, 200, and 300 vehicles
• Privacy Metrics: TSR and GTSR
• Number of Attacking Stations: 3
• Listening range of attacking stations: 500m, 700m and 1000m
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For the urban scenarios, we considered 6500m x 6500m area in the city of Lon-
don, Ontario, while for the highway scenarios, we considered a 26,000m by 11,000m
area on the outskirts of London, Ontario. In both cases, OpenStreetMap [102] was
used to obtain realistic geographical map files. We evaluated the effect of adversary
placement on different PCSs, under different traffic conditions, attacker capabilities
and eavesdropping duration, by varying the following parameters:
4.3.1 Number of eavesdropped vehicles
The objective of the placement strategies presented in this paper is to increase the
number of “eavesdropped” vehicles, i.e. the set of vehicles (Na) that come within the
listening range of at least one attacking station. Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 compares the
number of eavesdropped vehicles for different placement schemes. We see that both
DBAP and SBAP significantly improve (by at least double) the chances that a vehicle
will come within range of an attacking device. The performance of DBAP and SBAP
is similar for the urban scenario, while SBAP performs better in highways.
Figure 4.1: Impact of attacker placement assessed by Na in Highway Scenario with
varying listening range
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Figure 4.2: Impact of attacker placement assessed by Na in Urban Scenario with
varying listening range
4.3.2 Results for the base case
We selected a standard set of parameters to observe the “base case” performance of
each PCS and placement scheme and then varied these to observe their effect on the
adversary’s tracking ability. For the base case, we simulated for 300 seconds with
a vehicle density of 200 in the presence of 3 eavesdropping stations with a 500m
listening range. The performance is measured in terms of the tracking success rate
(TSR) and global tracking success rate (GTSR).
Fig. 4.3 shows the GTSR values for highway traffic using different PCSs, for
random, DBAP and SBAP placement schemes respectively. The performance of PCS
depends on placement schemes, based on their triggers and frequency of pseudonym
change. This means that if the adversary is aware of PCS being used, this information
can be exploited to use the placement strategy with the highest GTSR for that
PCS. Overall, SLOW has the worst performance (i.e. highest GTSR) among the
4 PCSs for highway scenario, with GTSR values of 33%, 35% and 44% for random,
DBAP and SBAP respectively. For periodic pseudonym changes, DBAP is the most
effective scheme with a GTSR of 40%. For CAPS, both DBAP and SBAP perform
similarly and much better than random placement, with GTSR values of 40% and
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Figure 4.3: Global TSR Highway Scenario
38%, respectively. The CPN approach, which is a cooperative approach and relies on
the neighbouring vehicles, works the best (has lowest GTSR) in the highway scenario
for all three placement schemes, with GTSR values of 15% - 22%.
The average GTSR overall PCS approaches for DBAP placement are 34%, and
SBAP placement is 33% as opposed to Random placement, which is 22.5%. Further-
more, regardless of PCS being used, random placement always has a lower GTSR,
compared to both DBAP and SBAP. This shows that with limited resources, the
strategic and intelligent placement of the eavesdropping stations can result in an in-
creased rate of successful tracking. It is important to note that for highway scenario,
three adversary stations with a listening range of 500m cover only a small fraction
of the region of interest (26000m x 11000m) and can still achieve overall successful
tracking of over 30%. By increasing the range or the number of stations, the coverage
can be expanded, which directly impacts the Global Tracking Success Rate.
Fig. 4.4 shows the corresponding GTSR values for the base case, for urban traffic.
The relative performance of PCSs is very similar to that for highway traffic, although
there is some slight variation in the actual values. For random placement, we ob-
served no significant differences between the highway and urban traffic. For DBAP,
more vehicles were tracked for periodic PCS and fewer for CAPS, with urban traffic.
Similarly, for SBAP GTSR value increased considerably for SLOW.
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Figure 4.4: Global TSR Urban Scenario
Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 show the TSR values for different privacy approaches and place-
ment schemes for highway and urban traffic, respectively. The TSR values are signif-
icantly higher than GTSR since they do not consider vehicles that are out of range
of the eavesdropping stations. For example, for highway traffic, the GTSR values for
a SLOW range from 33% - 44%, while the corresponding values for TSR are 85%
- 94% and for CPN using DBAP, the TSR is 100%. It is interesting to note that
there appears to be no clear correlation between the placement scheme and TSR.
For example, in several cases, random placement results in higher TSR than in more
informed schemes like DBAP or SBAP. Both of these observations can be explained
by the fact that TSR calculations ignore all vehicles that are not ’observed’ by any
listening station. This means that if a listening station is in an area with very few
vehicles, it will likely be able to successfully track those vehicles since fewer vehicles
mean less confusion for the attacker. This will lead to a higher TSR, even though
many vehicles are not being observed at all. In such cases, random placement will
produce a higher TSR as the other approaches always try to put stations in the most
congested locations. It can also lead to a TSR of 100% if very few vehicles appear
within the stations’ listening range, leading to easier tracking.
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Figure 4.5: TSR Highway Scenario
4.3.3 Vehicle Density




CAPS CPN PRD SLOW CAPS CPN PRD SLOW CAPS CPN PRD SLOW
100 17 20 30.5 11.3 25 48 45.5 32.7 25 20 38.5 35.7
200 17 15.5 28.5 34.3 34 22 46 35.3 34 20.5 27.5 51
300 30 15.5 11.3 34.7 48 17 47 25.3 39 17.5 27 51.3
Tables 4.1, and 4.2 shows the performance of the different PCSs for different
vehicle densities on the road network. PCSs may or may not directly rely on the
number of neighbouring vehicles. For instance, CAPS is context-aware and relies on
nearby vehicles for changing IDs. CPN also depends on the number of vehicles and
leads to more frequent pseudonym changes as vehicle density increases. The vehicles
using the CPN scheme would force the neighbouring vehicle to change the pseudonym
simultaneously, irrespective of the delay between two consequent changes. SLOW
and periodic schemes, on the other hand, are independent of the vehicle density. The
urban road topology is complex and contains the intersections and traffic light rules.
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Figure 4.6: TSR Urban Scenario
Table 4.1 compares the GTSR for the different PCSs with 100, 200 and 300 vehicles
in the urban road network. In this section, we discuss how the performance of each
PCS varies with vehicle density.
CAPS: The context-aware scheme shows the highest tracking rate of 48% in the
presence of 300 vehicles with a DBAP placement strategy and the least with random
placement with a tracking rate of 17%. In general, the GTSR increases with vehicle
density, irrespective of the placement strategy used. With more vehicles, there are
more resulting pseudonym changes. The overall GTSR increases as the count of
the successful tracking events increase with respect to the overall tracking events.
When there are more vehicles around the target vehicle, it increases the frequency of
pseudonym change with the CAPS scheme, and the distance-based attacker placement
strategy can track these effectively. SBAP placement strategy will show the gradual
decline in the tracking rate if the number of eavesdropping stations remains the same
while the distance among these stations starts increasing. The performance of DBAP
and SBAP is very similar for 100 and 200 vehicles.
CPN: The cooperative scheme has the highest tracking rate of 48% in the presence
of 100 vehicles with a DBAP strategy. The GTSR decreases as the vehicle density
increases. This scheme triggers a huge number of pseudonym changes as the number
of vehicles increases, making it difficult to track the vehicles. The results are especially
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CAPS CPN PRD SLOW CAPS CPN PRD SLOW CAPS CPN PRD SLOW
100 16 18 33 11 24 46.5 42.5 36 24 25 36 49.33
200 16 15.5 25.5 33 40 20 41 35.3 38 22.5 28 44
300 37 15.5 10.7 33.7 54 18 47 25.7 38 21 25.3 43.3
interesting when observed from the attacker’s standpoint that the knowledge of traffic
patterns (dense or sparse) in urban areas can allow the adversary to strategically use
the placement strategy accordingly to achieve optimal tracking rate. In our mobility
model with random trip-up, the growing number of vehicles was out of the observation
of the eavesdropping station, causing a decrease in the overall tracking rate. This
effect was particularly evident for DBAP placement.
Periodic: For a periodic scheme, the best placement strategy is DBAP, as it has
the highest GTSR overall, regardless of the number of vehicles. Randomly placing
the eavesdropper results poorly for the tracker while SBAP performs well with 38.5%
of tracking with 100 vehicles and gradually shows the decline as the stations are
separated.
SLOW: As expected, SBAP has the highest tracking rates (35% - 51%) for the
SLOW scheme, as it places attacking stations where pseudonym changes are likely
to occur. The tracking rate increases with several vehicles when using SBAP. The
GTSR for DBAP (25% - 36%) and random placement (11% - 35%) is much lower
since they do not allow the tracker to strategically cover high traffic areas or the areas
with potential traffic jams. With DBAP, GTSR does not seem to correlate strongly
with several vehicles, while it increases with vehicular density increases for random
placement.
For the highway scenario, the GTSR values for each PCS followed a similar trend
as for the urban roads, although there were some variations in the actual values.
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4.4 Conclusion
To summarize the key findings of this chapter, we proposed two new intelligent adver-
sary placement strategies- i) distance based attacker placement (DBAP) and ii) speed
based attacker placement (SBAP) which aim to maximize the degree of observation
with limited capabilities. We evaluated the privacy level provided by four observed
PCSs in the presence of a local passive adversary. We assessed the threat level, which
indicates the effectiveness of the adversary. We observed the total number of vehicles
eavesdropped in the presence of these adversarial settings in different traffic scenar-
ios. We then examined the successful tracking based on two metrics, Tracking Success
Rate and Global Tracking Success Rate.
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A Context Aware and Traffic Adaptive
PCS in VANETs
5.1 Introduction
There are various PCSs proposed in the last decade; however, these schemes have
limitations. Several PCSs rely on radio silence, which is not a suitable choice for the
safety-critical messaging [22] [79]. Some schemes work better in high vehicle density
areas [68] [83] [72] [87] while others depend on specific zones [69] [73]. This dependency
on the traffic scenario and zones within the road network impacts privacy. These
schemes are not adaptive to the changing vehicular scenarios based on the region
(city or highway). Li [79] proposed a scheme in which vehicles exchange pseudonyms
and use radio silence when changing pseudonyms. In terms of preserving privacy, this
scheme would perform better than other schemes. But the exchange of the identities
conflicts with the requirement of conditional privacy [82] [85]. The cooperative [80]
and synchronous [81] PCSs are the general mix context schemes where vehicles signal
neighbouring vehicle(s) to change the pseudonyms simultaneously. For these schemes,
the frequency of pseudonym change is usually very high. With rapid changes, the
pseudonyms exhaust when provided in a limited number. Currently, the emerging
standards have a limit for the number of issued pseudonyms to a vehicle that has a
lifetime of three years. The current scheme in standards is the result of the availability
of the limited number of pseudonyms. A vehicle periodically changes pseudonyms
every five minutes, and once the allocated pseudonyms are exhausted, it is forced to
reuse pseudonyms throughout the remaining period [37]. This introduces a privacy
vulnerability because the repetition allows easy tracking as the Adversary has the
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prior knowledge of the used pseudonyms. Among all the existing PCSs, context-aware
schemes take advantage of the information about neighbouring vehicles. CAPS [101]
is one such scheme in which the vehicle detects a nearby vehicle, and when both
the vehicles agree, they stop BSM broadcasting for some time. This is an effective
approach when viewed for privacy only; however, in terms of balancing safety and
privacy, such schemes using radio silence are not very attractive. An intelligent passive
adversary may also know about the PCS; therefore, one of the main limitations is the
use of static triggers.
A comprehensive PCS should leverage different factors to increase anonymity in
an ad-hoc environment with a defensive approach to protect from the tracking based
on eavesdropping. Rapidly changing pseudonyms provide more privacy and can lead
to a vehicle’s being exhausted quickly, since only a limited number of pseudonyms
are available, due to the limited memory of OBU. This leads to the reuse of previous
pseudonyms, allowing easier tracking of the target vehicle. An ideal PCS should allow
frequent pseudonym changes to preserved anonymity without being constrained by
the number of available pseudonyms.
As mentioned earlier, using radio silence before pseudonym changes are effective
in terms of the untraceability of vehicles but can compromise safety [36]. Therefore
it is desirable to implement a PCS that can effectively maintain vehicle anonymity
without requiring radio silence. The constant frequency and predictable timing for
pseudonym change can be used by the Adversary to deduce a pattern over a period of
eavesdropping. So, good PCS should use unpredictable triggers to initiate pseudonym
changes.
In this chapter, we propose a new PCS that aims to benefit the most from the
context of the vehicle and traffic patterns to leverage the optimum situation for chang-
ing pseudonyms. The vehicles change the pseudonym simultaneously in a region to
increase privacy by maximizing the anonymity set.
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5.2 System Architecture
Our model considers that the vehicles are equipped with DSRC enabled On-Board
Units (OBUs), which facilitate the Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) as well as Vehicle to In-
frastructure (V2I) Communication. There are three main entities, namely, Certificate
Authority (CA), RSU, OBU which communicate with each other. All the entities in
this vehicular communication, including RSUs, CAs and vehicles, have a set of public
and private keys for secure communication.
CA
CA in VANETs is responsible for issuance of a set of a public and a private key to the
participating vehicles and RSUs in the vehicular network. RSUs and Vehicles have
the public key of CA. CA also issues the initial seed to the authorized vehicles for
pseudonym generation. CA maintains the database for the long-term accountability
of the registered vehicles by keeping the original vehicle identification and the assigned
seed along with the issuance time. CA is an integral part of the Security Credential
Management System(SCMS), which has high computational facilities and extensive
storage capabilities. The information from this database is used to investigate mali-
cious activities. In this work, we are focusing primarily on the usage and change of
the pseudonyms. Therefore, the generation and revocation of the pseudonym are not
in the scope of this work. However, we indicate that law enforcement will contact
CA and use this information from the database to identify or confirm the malicious
vehicle. Our PCS assures the balance of accountability while providing conditional
privacy. The database contains the following information, which enables accountabil-
ity.
• Enrollment Certificate of Vehicle with assigned seed S and timestamp t
• RSU ID, Location Coordinates and range of RSU R
• Seed S, RSU ID which assigned S, timestamp t
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• Currently active seed S with RSU IDs of encountered RSUs
RSU
The DSRC-based RSUs are interconnected to each other as well as with the back-end
CAs via a wired network. This network of RSUs works as the backbone network
architecture, helping in the fast intercommunication of RSUs. RSUs are responsible
for the distribution of the seeds to the vehicles in their ranges and also for triggering
pseudonym changes based on vehicle contexts and traffic. We assume that RSUs are
trusted entities. RSUs are also useful in terms of computation; however, sometimes
sending more data to process on the RSU can cause network congestion. We consider
that the vehicles send BSM with the pseudonym. The validity of this pseudonym is
verified by the RSU of that region so that vehicles do not have to perform additional
computation. Each Vehicle v registers itself with its regional RSU when it enters the
transmission range of the RSU, which monitors all the vehicles within its vicinity.
Upon successful registration, RSU provides a time map of TM to the vehicle. This
time map consists of randomly distributed timestamps for initiating the pseudonym
change cycle. The RSU is responsible for verifying the pseudonyms used in BSMs, as
opposed to all the vehicles. To check the validity of the pseudonym, RSU performs
the same steps as the vehicle to obtain the pseudonym from the seed. RSU monitors
BSM activity in its region and makes sure all the pseudonyms used in these BSMs
are valid. When an unverified pseudonym is encountered in the range, RSU sends a
message to all the vehicles in its range, informing about the untrusted vehicle. RSU
is responsible for the coordinated pseudonym change based on the traffic and context
information of all the vehicles in its range.
Vehicle/OBU
The Participating Vehicle is equipped with OBU which periodically broadcast the
situational awareness information to its immediate environment for safety applica-
tions. It has a Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) for securing sensitive information on the
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vehicle, such as credentials. The vehicle can participate in Vehicular Communication
once CA authorizes the vehicle. Upon successful authorization, Vehicle V enrolls with
CA and obtains a seed S for pseudonym generation, which is signed by CAPR and
contains timestamp t at which the seed is issued.
Pseudonym Generation and Usage The pseudonyms are generated by using
the Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [103], which takes a secret
key and a cryptographic hash function. HMAC is used to ensure the authenticity and
integrity of the message. However, we are using HMAC to generate pseudonyms as
a hash chain. These pseudonyms are used for BSM authentication and misbehaviour
reporting. The secret key is the seed value given by CA to the vehicle upon autho-
rization to allow participation in a vehicular network. The vehicle can generate new
pseudonyms using this secret key.
5.3 Proposed PN lifecycle
5.3.1 Initialization
The initial issuance of the seed to vehicle solely relies on CA that enrolls the vehicle
based on the enrollment certificate of OBU and provides a seed for generating the
pseudonyms. This enrollment is carried out once to join the vehicular network. The
seed is provided to the vehicle for generating pseudonyms, and this seed is signed
with the CAs private key to indicate the authenticity of the seed.
5.3.2 Vehicle registration
As soon as the vehicle encounters an RSU, it registers itself with this RSU by giving
its seed for the time it is going to be in the range of this RSU. Fig. 5.1 demonstrates
the registration process of the vehicle with the regional RSU . Each RSU sends a
periodic announcement which contains RSUPK , RSU ID and timestamp t. When a
vehicle V receives this announcement, it sends the Registration Request to the RSU ,
which contains the seed S and timestamp t, as shown in Fig. 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: Vehicle Registration with regional RSU
Figure 5.2: Message Structure for Vehicle-RSU communication
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This request message is encrypted using RSUPK . Once the Road Side Unit re-
ceives the Registration Request, it verifies the seed S using CAPK .
With this mechanism of seed registration, RSU holds the vehicles accountable at
the regional level. It will also reduce the communication and computational overhead
caused by the verification of the Basic Safety Messages by the receiving vehicles. RSU
is responsible for verifying the pseudonyms used in the BSMs in its area. According
to currently proposed standards, the receiving vehicle verifies the pseudonym. Con-
sidering the frequency of the BSMs and heavy traffic scenarios, a receiving vehicle has
to verify a large number of pseudonyms. In our scheme, RSU takes care of verification
and informs the vehicles about the malicious vehicle when encountered.
5.3.3 BSM broadcast
For safety purposes, the vehicles communicate the information related to situational
awareness with each other. A vehicle sends the safety message with the pseudonym
identity for BSM authentication. RSU authenticates the vehicles in its range and
informs all the vehicles in case of misbehaviour detection. The receiving vehicles do
not perform verification, which accelerates the processing of received BSMs.
5.3.4 Handling misbehaviour
With the registration of the vehicles, RSU can hold the vehicles accountable, which
are in its region. If a vehicle fails to register, it is considered a malicious vehicle.
RSU and other vehicles can receive BSMs from the unregistered vehicle. However, if
RSU does not verify the sending vehicle, then RSU sends the alert message to the
vehicles in its area. As shown in Fig. 5.2, RSU sends the unverified pseudonym
to the registered vehicles so that the receiving vehicles do not process BSM as the
pseudonym identity used in BSM matches the one in the alert message. The main
advantage of this mechanism is that RSU can detect the misbehaviour immediately at
the regional level. This mechanism partially supports the active attacks, which involve
the alteration of the pseudonym, such as impersonation attack or replay attack. RSU
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can detect if there are two copies of the same pseudonym or a vehicle that generates
a fake pseudonym and has not registered with RSU. Both of these cases cause RSU
to trigger a challenge and response in which RSU determines the authorization of the
vehicle by asking the vehicle to generate the next possible pseudonym. In this case,
only one can generate the correct pseudonym, and this accelerates the identification
of the malicious node in the network at the regional level. The strength of using
the HMAC-based pseudonym generation is that it prevents pseudonym repetition
and supports the recognition of malicious vehicles. The active attacks are not in the
scope of our work.
5.4 Proposed Pseudonym Changing Scheme
In this section, we present our proposed Context-Aware and Traffic Adaptive (CATA)
pseudonym changing scheme. RSUs are responsible for initiating the process of
pseudonym change and uses information about the context of vehicles in its range, to
dynamically determine when pseudonym change should occur. Each vehicle calculates
its context, which can include speed, direction and distance of neighbouring vehicles,
and sends this information to the RSU. Based on the information received from ve-
hicles and the current traffic density in its regions, the RSU decides if pseudonym
change should occur and informs the vehicles accordingly.
When a vehicle changes pseudonyms, the surrounding traffic conditions have a
significant impact on whether an adversary can link the old and new pseudonyms.
The primary factors that affect this include the number of other vehicles near the
ego vehicle, the distance from other vehicles, and the relative speed and direction
of travel of the surrounding vehicles. We refer to these as the context of a vehicle.
When several vehicles are moving in the same direction, with similar speeds and are
close by each other, this situation serves as an ideal pseudonym changing condition.
The proximity of many similar context vehicles changing pseudonyms simultaneously
makes it difficult for the Adversary to link old and new pseudonyms to the same
vehicle accurately. To have a strong PCS, a high degree of context match is essential
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as it increases the anonymity of the vehicle while decreasing the Adversary’s tracking
success rate. The network of vehicles on the road changes rapidly based on the time
of the day and locality/area. The traffic patterns can vary depending on the type of
road segment (urban or highway), the number of vehicles (sparse or dense traffic),
road conditions, etc. In our scheme, each RSU is aware of the current traffic patterns
(TPRSU) in its region and considers this in determining when vehicles should change
pseudonyms.
Figure 5.3: Overview of CATA Pseudonym Changing Scheme
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The proposed approach differs from CAPS based on the usage of the context
information. In CAPS, the context information is used to detect a neighbouring
vehicle in silence; it turns to silence as well. In case no vehicle in the immediate
environment is silent, the vehicle sends BSMs until it reaches a maximum pseudonym
time and then turns to silence. This radio silence is used to confuse the Adversary by
disrupting the continuous stream of BSMs. In terms of safety and privacy trade-off,
the radio silence provides privacy by putting safety at risk. Therefore, we avoid the
radio silence to ensure that there is no disruption in the safety-critical messaging.
This is the main reason that our scheme does not impact the frequency of BSMs;
hence, it complies with the currently proposed rate of BSM transmission. In our
proposed CATA pseudonym changing scheme, the context information is used to
detect the neighbouring vehicle(s) with similar speed and heading. By determining
at least one such vehicle close by, when the cooperative pseudonym change occurs,
it not only maximizes the anonymity set but increases chances of the unsuccessful
tracking events.
Table 5.1: Notations used in the proposed scheme
Notation Description
CA Certificate Authority
Nv Set of neighbouring vehicles for node v
VRSU Set of vehicles in the range of a RSU
µ Number of Vehicles with Context-Match
φv Context Flag for vehicle v
ρ Traffic Adaptive Threshold
RSUv RSU with which vehicle v is currently registered
dirv Direction of Vehicle (node)
speedv Speed of vehicle v
distu,v Distance between vehicles u and v
dth Distance threshold for context similarity
sth Relative speed threshold for context similarity
i Current index in time map (TM)
TMi time at which next pseudonym change cycle starts
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The RSU has the record of all the vehicles in its range, and upon registration,
RSU sends a time map (TM) and the current index i to the vehicle. TM contains
a list of randomly distributed timestamps for triggering each successive round of the
pseudonym change cycle. Both the RSU and the individual vehicles (after regis-
tration) in its range have access to the same TM and are responsible for carrying
out their respective tasks and communicating with each other when the process is
triggered, as shown in Fig. 5.3.
Algorithm 3 and 4 outline the steps carried out at the RSU and each vehicle v ∈
VRSU respectively. At the RSU (Algorithm 3 ), TMi is the next time the pseudonym
change cycle should start. In steps 1 and 2, the RSU simply waits until the process
can start (i.e. CurrentT ime == TMi). Once the process starts, the index i is
incremented (step 3) to point to the start time for the next round. Next, the RSU
calculates the traffic adaptive threshold (ρ), which determines what percentage of
vehicles in its region need to report a non-zero context flag to trigger pseudonym
change. This threshold depends on the current traffic patterns and set of vehicles in
the region. RSUs can frequently change this percentage to introduce more variability
in terms of the conditions for triggering pseudonym change. The RSU then waits
for half of the time before reaching the next cycle to receive context flags from the
vehicles in its range (step 5) and calculates the total number of vehicles with a positive
context match (µ) in step 6. If µ exceeds the value calculated using the threshold
(ρ), then a message is sent to all vehicles in the range of the RSU to change their
pseudonyms. Otherwise, no pseudonym change takes place in the current round.
Algorithm 3 RSU triggers pseudonym change if needed
Require: µ, TPRSU , VRSU , TM, i
1: for all CurrentT ime <= TMi do
2: Wait to initiate pseudonym change cycle
3: i = i+ 1
4: ρ = calc Traffic Threshold(VRSU , TPRSU)




7: if µ >= ρ · |VRSU | then
8: Send Change Pseudonym message to all v ∈ VRSU
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At each vehicle v ∈ VRSU (Algorithm 4), steps 1-3 to initiate pseudonym change
are the same as in Algorithm 3. For the individual vehicles, the algorithm proceeds
in two phases. During Phase 1, each vehicle v calculates its context flag (φv) and
sends it to the RSU. This is done by checking the context similarity (steps 5 - 7)
with each vehicle u ∈ Nv in its neighbourhood. Two vehicles have similar contexts
if they are close to each other, have similar speeds and are travelling in the same
direction. As soon as the first similar-context vehicle is found in the neighbourhood,
the context flag is set to 1 (step 8), and this information is sent to the RSU (step
9). No additional vehicles in the neighbourhood are checked, and Phase 1 ends.
The concept of sensing the immediate environment of the vehicle before a change of
pseudonym is an essential aspect of our CATA PCS. When the decision to change
pseudonym is based on a dynamic and adaptive trigger, which takes context and
situation of the vehicle into account, it promises more privacy than the predictable,
known and constant triggers.
After Phase 1, the vehicle must wait for some time to receive a Change Pseudonym
message. If the message is received, Phase 2 starts and v generates a new pseudonym
Algorithm 4 Vehicle v changes its pseudonym if directed by RSU
Require: Nv, TM, i, dth, sth, dirv, speedv
Require: diru, speedu, distu,v∀u ∈ Nv, u 6= v
1: while CurrentT ime <= TMi do
2: Wait to start context check
3: i = i+1
Phase 1 - Vehicle v calculates its context flag
4: for all u ∈ Nv do
5: if distu,v <= dth then
6: if diru == dirv then
7: if |speedu − speedv| <= sth then
8: Set φv = 1
9: Send context flag (φv) to RSUv
10: break
Phase 2 - Vehicle v updates pseudonym
11: if Change Pseudonym message is received from RSUv then
12: pseudonymv = generate PN(seedv, pseudonymv−1)
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based on its seed and a current pseudonym. Otherwise, the pseudonym changes cycle
ends without any updates to the current pseudonym, and the vehicle waits for the
next cycle to start.
Advantages of Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme increases the anonymity of the individual and untraceability of
the vehicle primarily because of the cooperative change of pseudonyms. There are
two main factors: a) several vehicles, and b) context matching neighbouring vehi-
cles, which increase the effectiveness of the pseudonym change concerning intelligent
tracking. CATA adapts according to the traffic patterns, and this contributes to the
dynamic nature of the trigger. An intelligent adversary may have prior knowledge of
PCS, and when the scheme has static triggers, the Adversary can take advantage of
it. Therefore, our scheme adapts the trigger based on the traffic patterns and does
not reveal any direct information regarding when the next pseudonym change will
occur. The trigger also needs to be random so that an intelligent adversary cannot
deduce a pattern or guess the next changing event. Our scheme does not impact the
frequency of BSM transmission, which ensures that there is no effect on the safety
applications when preserving privacy. Another advantage of our scheme is that unlike
other schemes, it does not allow the repetition of the pseudonyms due to the limited
available set of pseudonyms. The vehicles do not verify the received BSMs while RSU
monitors BSM transmission and verifies the sender’s authenticity. Due to this reason,
the misbehaving vehicles can be identified immediately, and this information can be
sent to all the vehicles in the transmission range.
5.5 Experimental Results
Simulation Setup
For the urban scenarios, we considered a 6500m by 6500m area in the city of London,
Ontario. In contrast, for the highway scenarios, we considered a 26,000m by 11,000m
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area on the outskirts of London, Ontario. Our scheme utilizes infrastructure units.
Therefore, the road network is accordingly covered in both scenarios using RSUs. In
the Urban scenario, 12 RSUs are placed in the triangular pattern, while in Highway
Scenario, it takes 13 RSUs with 50 m of overlap in the transmission range in both
cases. We have used random trip generation for urban traffic for different origins
and assign different routes to distinct destinations. We evaluated the level of privacy
provided by the observed schemes with metrics based on the user’s and Adversary’s
perspectives. For the assessment, we consider a local passive adversary with a limited
number of equipment, in total six of the attacking stations. We assess our proposed
PCS by comparing it with three other schemes in different adversary placements.
These PCSs use different techniques to change the pseudonyms such as radio silence,
constant rate of change, neighbouring vehicle and context. We measure the effect of
adversary placements on different PCSs with two types of road networks (Urban and
Highway) and attacker capabilities based on the following parameters, as discussed
in Table 5.2.
Location Privacy Evaluation
The evaluation of privacy is subjected to the context and situation of the user. The
anonymity of the individual in the network is based on the neighbouring vehicles,
and it depends on the traffic patterns at the regional level. The uncertainty of de-
identifying an individual is relative to the locality and road network. When a PCS
takes into account the changing environment of the vehicle, the trigger to change
pseudonym tends to be dynamic, and the scheme becomes user-centric. This means
a vehicle finds an optimized situation to change the pseudonym simultaneously with
neighbouring vehicles [86] [101]. When PCS is dependent on the neighbouring vehi-
cles, the anonymity of the vehicle heavily depends on the traffic density and traffic
patterns. With the increase in the number of vehicles, the uncertainty of recognizing
the vehicle gets higher. Contrary to this case, PCS with the static triggers like a
periodical change of the pseudonym [37] is independent of the traffic movement and
the number of vehicles. However, the anonymity level still relies on these factors even
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Table 5.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation Framework OMNET++, SUMO, VEINS, PREXT
Geographical Map Tool OpenStreetMap
Traffic Scenarios Urban, Highway
Urban region
City of London, ON,
6500 m x 6500 m
Highway Region
Outskirts of London, ON,
26,000 m x 11,000 m





Minimum period between two
broadcasts is 0.1 secs
Carrier Frequency 5.890e9 Hz
OBU Carrier Sensitivity -89dBm
Transmission Power 20mW
Bitrate 18Mbps




Compared PCSs Periodic, CPN, CAPS and our scheme CATA
Placement Scheme Random, DBAP and SBAP
Number of Attacking Stations 6
Number of RSUs in Scenarios 12 (Urban) and 13 (Highway)
Listening Range of Adversary 1000m
Eavesdropping Duration 300 sec
Tracking NNPDA [61]
Metrics
Entropy of Anonymity Set,
Global Tracking Success Rate
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though periodical PCS itself does not depend on the traffic. When assessing location
privacy, we consider the user’s as well as Adversary’s perspectives to investigate the
robustness of our CATA PCS in the presence of intelligent adversaries. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first evaluation to examine both points of view. This
assessment reflects the level of privacy in terms of the randomness of the target ve-
hicle within an anonymity set and the ability of the Adversary to identify the target
vehicle successfully.
We note that the average number of pseudonym changing events occurring with
each PCS differs. The cooperative scheme has the highest rate of change of pseudonyms
followed by our scheme and then CAPS scheme in both scenarios. The periodic
scheme is bound by the constant time period, and it directly depends on the length
of the simulation rather than the traffic situation. In our evaluation, with the pe-
riodic scheme, the vehicles change pseudonyms one time during their trips. With
a cooperative scheme, the vehicles are forced to change along with another vehicle
that intends to change the pseudonym. Therefore, we observe a spike of 19 changing
events on average. The rate of change of pseudonym with CAPS will increase with
the dense traffic scenarios in which vehicles are moving close to each other. On the
other hand, our scheme is adaptive to traffic density, which means the rate of change
of pseudonym would not be affected by the number of vehicles. Also, due to the ran-
domness introduced by the time map, the average number of pseudonym changes will
vary because essentially, it is a time map that initiates the pseudonym change cycle.
In this experiment, we observed an average of 14 changing events with the CATA
scheme. With the CAPS scheme, on average, the vehicles changed pseudonyms six
times. The higher frequency of change is an advantage if the pseudonyms are not re-
peated, and there are enough pseudonyms available. Our scheme covers this aspect;
it not only has a high frequency of pseudonym change but also avoids repetition by
generating a new pseudonym.
Another important observation is related to the number of vehicles that encoun-
tered the Adversary. Vehicular trips are random in all scenarios, and the vehicles on
average encounter two attacking stations in an urban scenario and three to four in
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highway scenarios. The number of encountered stations rely on traffic modelling as
well as the eavesdropping duration.
Privacy Evaluation: User’s Perspective
We examined the Entropy of Anonymity Set for three of the existing PCSs and
our proposed scheme. This privacy metric mainly relies on traffic movement and
PCS. We observed the Urban and Highway traffic scenarios and noticed that the
randomness varies in both of these scenarios but overall shows similar trends. The
Urban scenario has relatively higher Entropy of Anonymity Set (EAS) because of
the complex road network. Generally, the Periodical Scheme shows the lowest EAS
because of the deterministic nature of PCS. Often, when a vehicle with Periodical PCS
changes the pseudonym, it is carried out individually, which decreases the randomness
significantly. The next higher EAS is of CAPS, which is moderately less than CPN
in the Urban scenario and slightly lower in the Highway scenario. As the traffic
movement remains the same for all the schemes, we observe that when PCS considers
the neighbouring vehicle to carry out the pseudonym change, the vehicle enjoys a
higher level of privacy with EAS in the range of 0.6 to 0.85. In the CPN scheme, the
vehicles change pseudonyms with high frequency; it introduces additional advantage,
thus, have higher EAS than CAPS. This frequency of changing the identifier is relative
to the traffic density. With more neighbouring vehicles, the number of pseudonyms
changing requests received by a vehicle increases; therefore, we observe rapid changes.
These quick changes are responsible for the rise in EAS of CPN when compared to
CAPS.
The underlying vehicular network remains the same when we assess all four PCSs
with a consistent number of vehicles, road networks, traffic patterns for both scenar-
ios. We noted the highest EAS for our proposed scheme in the Urban scenario with
slightly lower EAS in Highway Scenario. The fundamental reason behind this trend
is the impact of the large scale cooperative pseudonym change, which maximizes
the anonymity set and increases the randomness. The uncertainty of determining
a specific vehicle among a large number of vehicles with new identifiers cause more
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Figure 5.4: Entropy of Anonymity Set: Urban and Highway Scenario
confusion for Adversary and affects the correctness of the tracking of the target vehi-
cle. CATA has a regional cooperative pseudonym change, which is carried out once
RSU determines the area’s significant traffic density. It also considers the context of
the vehicles in their area. Both traffic and context together become the key reason
for the higher EAS. In the previous case of CAPS, the pseudonym change is carried
out by using the context of the vehicle. However, it is subjected to the neighbouring
vehicles only while CATA uses the context of the vehicles and uses this information
at the regional level. When a sufficient number of vehicles indicates that they have
at least one vehicle with matching context, RSU further decisions based on the traffic
density when to change the pseudonym. The intricacies of the context of the vehicle
and the traffic movement, as observed by RSU, results in higher EAS.
Privacy Evaluation: Adversary’s Perspective
For privacy assessment, the Adversary’s perspective is as significant as the user’s
point of view. When we discuss the privacy-preserving schemes, we are inherently
aiming to prevent information loss, which can be used to infer the private information
of an individual. Therefore, we emphasize that the PCSs need thorough investigation
with a consistent set of traffic models and in the presence of intelligent adversary
models. It allows the examination of how successfully an adversary can track and
determine the target vehicles throughout their trips. The trends, as shown in Fig.
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5.5 reflects the Global Tracking Success Rate (GTSR) in the presence of different
adversary placements in the Urban Scenario. It is important to notice that GTSR
is the tracking rate observed with respect to all the vehicles in simulation and not
merely the Adversary’s encountered vehicles. It is highly unlikely that the local
passive Adversary eavesdrops all the vehicles in the scenario. It mainly depends on
the number of attacking stations and the coverage of the road network. With different
placement strategies, the coverage varies, which plays an important role in overall
tracking. The assessment shows the percentage for GTSR always lower than 50%.
This is because the attacking stations are disjoint, therefore when the vehicles are
not in the Adversary’s range, then that vehicular trip counts toward the unsuccessful
tracking event. Another factor is that the vehicle may be re-identified as a new vehicle
when it enters the next station range. With limited eavesdropping stations, the overall
number of unsuccessful events increases, which leads to overall lower GTSR. When
attacking stations are in areas with low vehicle density, it is easier to track the limited
number of vehicles in its range since fewer vehicles cause less confusion. However,
overall only a small percentage of vehicles are being eavesdropped.
Generally, Periodical PCS shows the highest GTSR because the vehicle changes
the pseudonym irrespective of context and surrounding traffic. The highest GTSR
is observed in the presence of distance-based attacker placement (DBAP) for the
periodical scheme. This placement scheme is ideal for such PCS, which has a deter-
Figure 5.5: GTSR in Urban Scenario
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Figure 5.6: GTSR in Highway Scenario
ministic pattern for changing the pseudonym. An intelligent adversary with DBAP
takes advantage of this fact and places the equipment by pacing out strategically in
high-density areas. However, the random placement and SBAP show nearly the same
GTSR as there is a rise of unsuccessful events mainly due to the gaps in the attack-
ing stations. For the CAPS scheme, random adversary placement shows the lowest
GTSR, while for SBAP and DBAP, there is a difference of 1%. CAPS is context-
based PCS, from the observation in Fig. 5.5, we notice that GTSR is higher than
CPN, which does not consider the context. This happens because the frequency of
the change is lower in CAPS than CPN. In both cases, at least two vehicles change the
pseudonyms simultaneously, yet the rapid changes in CPN become the advantage in
terms of protecting against continuous tracking. CPN has the highest tracking success
with DBAP placement, followed by SBAP and Random placement. Our proposed
CATA scheme outperforms the observed PCSs with the lowest GTSR in all adversary
placements. Our CATA PCS introduces a variety of factors which collectively prevent
successful tracking. Primarily, the proposed PCS does not allow a deterministic pat-
tern of the pseudonym change. When the PCS involves the dynamic triggers, which
are random and remain unknown to the Adversary, we have seen in the case of CPN
and CAPS that the tracking rate decreases. However, CATA prevents a higher level
of tracking because of the cooperative regional pseudonym change. The vehicles in
the RSU’s area form larger anonymity set as the occurrence of pseudonym change
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is a regional event. In this case, not only the vehicles have context matching vehi-
cles, but also overall, RSU triggers the changing event based on the traffic density.
These triggers are effective because these are based on the surrounding environment
of vehicle and adaptation to the traffic scenarios. TM becomes the prominent factor
of unpredictability as it is completely random, and there is no beacon broadcast for
initiating the process. Therefore, the Adversary is left with no information regarding
the next pseudonym change. All these factors neutralize the placement strategies as
these strategies would need prior knowledge or deterministic patterns in PCS to best
place the attacking stations to eavesdrop a maximum number of vehicles. However,
we noticed that despite the intelligent placements, the overall tracking remains very
low. In Fig. 5.6, we examined the Highway Scenario that the general trend remains
similar to Urban Scenario. CATA shows the lowest GTSR for Random placement
with a minor increase in SBAP placement and then rises for DBAP. In the high-
way scenario, the traffic patterns are relatively more predictable. But the limited
attacking stations in the large area keeps overall GTSR lower. It becomes easier for
the vehicles to find the context matching vehicle as compared to the Urban scenario.
The road network in the Urban scenario is complex while on the highway, the vehicles
move in either of the two directions, and overall it increases the percentage of vehicles
moving in the same direction with similar speed and
5.6 Conclusion
We presented a novel PCS to maximize the level of location privacy in Vehicular Ad
hoc Networks. This PCS has two main components, namely, Context and Traffic pat-
tern. When these properties are taken into consideration for PCS, the vehicle is less
likely to change the pseudonym when the Adversary can easily de-identify the target
vehicle. By keeping in mind, the intelligent adversaries, we have systematically devel-
oped CATA PCS by integrating the best possible situational and methodical aspects.
For the development of this scheme, we introduce some changes to the architecture
model. Typically, a set of pseudonyms is assigned by the Certificate Authority while
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we consider that CA issues a seed for the pseudonym generation. By introducing this
factor, we aim to eliminate the problem of the frequency of pseudonym change. Usu-
ally, due to a limited number of pseudonyms, the vehicle restricted to use pseudonyms
in a way that expands the duration of pseudonym usage. Another important reason
for introducing this mechanism is that it preserves the conditional privacy and ac-
countability at a localized level, which means that RSU can detect the malicious
activities regarding the identity of the vehicles such as impersonation attack. There-
fore, this mechanism has twofold benefits; it allows a multitude of pseudonym changes
while enabling the detection of malicious vehicles at the perimeter.
We carried out simulation runs in different traffic environments and in the presence
of various adversary placements to assess PCS. To determine the effectiveness of our
scheme, we compared our scheme with the existing schemes. Our evaluation quantifies
the privacy of Users and Adversary’s perspectives. We analyzed that our PCS not
only outperforms other schemes by promising a higher level of anonymity but also
prevent the intelligent adversaries from de-identifying the user with the least global
tracking success rate in both Urban and Highway Scenarios.
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Conclusions
Privacy is a rising concern for vehicular communication. Intelligent Transportation
System aims to increase road safety with this evolving technology. However, it should
not be at the cost of the privacy of the driver. In the near future, the connectivity of
vehicles with the environment will be a part of the larger smart city ecosystem. There
are emerging standards across the globe for Vehicle-to-Everything communication.
Embedding privacy in the design of these systems is paramount, as it will be difficult
to sufficiently modify once the systems are deployed.
Privacy is a concept that is not only difficult to define precisely but also presents
challenges in terms of quantification. When it comes to putting a number on for the
measurement, the concrete level of privacy becomes very dependent on the underlying
measurement factors as well as the context. In this dissertation, we have developed
the framework for the equitable privacy assessment, which provides a systematic
approach for evaluating PCSs. It aims to help the academic research community in
the future development and assessment of PCSs. The industry standard bodies can
utilize it as a systematic method for privacy assessment of vehicular communication.
It facilitates the assessment and comparison of the PCSs with a consistent set of
parameters, models and metrics.
One of the major concerns in the privacy assessment is poor adversary modelling.
When evaluating privacy, we aim to check the resilience of PCS against the local pas-
sive adversary, with reasonable capabilities to take advantage of known traffic patterns
and calculate vehicle trajectories. To address this issue, we proposed two intelligent
adversary placements algorithms that use prior knowledge of traffic activity in the
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area. The strength of the adversary has a direct impact on the assessment. Therefore,
it is essential to incorporate the strong adversary models in the assessments.
Finally, yet importantly, our privacy assessments of existing schemes revealed
several vulnerabilities and shortcomings. We have developed a new comprehensive
PCS in which we addressed the limitations of existing PCSs. Our PCS is context-
aware and traffic oriented that focuses on the maximum achievable anonymity in
order to minimize successful tracking. The proposed scheme allows a large number
of vehicles to change pseudonym simultaneously and prior to this change, the ideal
situation is decided based on the context of the vehicles and traffic in that area. The
adversary heavily relies on the prior information to deduce the pattern. By knowing
when and how the pseudonyms are being changed, the adversary can estimate when
the next pseudonym change will happen. To counteract this, we introduced random
triggers to initiate the pseudonym change process. After the process is initiated, a
chain of events are put in place to decide the suitable situation for pseudonym change,
and the final pseudonym change becomes harder to track for the adversary. We
assessed our PCS from the user and adversary standpoint and compared it with the
existing PCSs. The results indicate that the proposed scheme outperforms existing
schemes and successfully keeps the driver anonymous at a higher degree and shows
the minimal rate of tracking.
Future Work
There are several experiment adaptations which can be performed by altering the
models and parameters. Future work concerns the deeper analysis of PCSs with
more sophisticated and diverse traffic models, which are based on real traffic data or
synthetic traffic data that closely resembles the realistic traffic patterns. Further, each
of the elements of the privacy assessment framework comprises a subset of parameters,
and their variation may have minor to a significant impact on privacy. The future
work with respect to the proposed PCS is the development of the overall system
architecture in which the proposed PCS becomes an inherent part of the pseudonym
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life cycle. Our work primarily focused on the segment where the pseudonyms are
changed. Also, we used HMAC based pseudonym generation mechanism, which is
different than the traditional pseudonym generation as a part of the pseudonym life
cycle.
We have also identified some of the future directions which are out of the scope
of this dissertation. These are some of the relevant issues that require further con-
sideration in future work. Our scheme is supported by infrastructure units. Hence,
there will be a requirement of a backup plan for the pseudonym changing scheme in
places where there is no infrastructure unit, or the vehicle does not encounter RSU.
Ideally, the vehicle should be able to change the pseudonym independently using a
user-oriented scheme that has dynamic triggers such as a cooperative scheme. It is
also necessary to tackle the misbehaving vehicles in the network. To address this
issue, there is a requirement of methods to detect misbehaviour and steps to revoke
pseudonyms. Once a vehicle is revoked, all the vehicles in the network need to be in-
formed about the blacklisted vehicles and their identifiers. The infrastructure units in
the network, as well as certificate authorities, do not fully attack resistant. Therefore,
there is further study required for handling the compromised RSUs and CAs.
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On the measurement of privacy as an attacker’s estimation error. International
journal of information security, 12(2):129–149, 2013.
122
[25] Saif Al-Sultan, Moath M Al-Doori, Ali H Al-Bayatti, and Hussien Zedan. A
comprehensive survey on vehicular ad hoc network. Journal of network and
computer applications, 37:380–392, 2014.
[26] John Krumm. A survey of computational location privacy. Personal and Ubiq-
uitous Computing, 13(6):391–399, 2009.
[27] Zhendong Ma, Frank Kargl, and Michael Weber. Measuring location privacy in
v2x communication systems with accumulated information. Mobile Adhoc and
Sensor Systems, 2009. MASS’09. IEEE 6th International Conference on, pages
322–331. IEEE, 2009.
[28] Amer Aijaz, Bernd Bochow, Florian Dötzer, Andreas Festag, Matthias Gerlach,
Rainer Kroh, and Tim Leinmüller. Attacks on inter vehicle communication
systems-an analysis. Proc. WIT, pages 189–194, 2006.
[29] Marius Wernke, Pavel Skvortsov, Frank Dürr, and Kurt Rothermel. A classi-
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